



# The 2019 Virginia School and Division Safety Survey Results



MARCH 2020



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# I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 1997, state law requires all public schools to conduct school safety audits ([§ 22.1-279.8](#)). The purpose is to assess the safety conditions of schools, identify and develop solutions for physical safety concerns, and identify and evaluate patterns of student safety concerns. Responses and solutions based on the audits include recommendations for structural adjustments, changes in school safety procedures, and revisions to school divisions' student code of conduct. The school and division surveys discussed in this report are one component of the School Safety Audit Program. Throughout this report, findings reflect the 2018–2019 school year and statistics reflect 1,961 schools (N = 1,961) or 132 school divisions (N = 132) unless otherwise noted.

## Findings from the School Safety Survey

- There were 1,961 responses to the 2018–2019 school safety survey received from Virginia's public schools. Of these, most were elementary schools (1,122), followed by middle schools (345), high schools (316), and other types of schools (178). All schools (100%) complied with the requirement to complete the survey.
- Most schools (94%) reported having at least one full-time or part-time, school-based mental health professional whose primary role was to provide counseling services to the students in 2018–2019. There were 114 schools (6% of all schools) that reported having no mental health professionals. The rate of mental health professionals per 1,000 students statewide was 3.67 for full-time and 1.99 for part-time, up slightly from the previous year. Rates for full-time mental health professionals were higher in middle, high, and other schools than in elementary.
- A majority of schools (64%) reported they had safety/security personnel working full-time or part-time during the 2018–2019 school year. School resource officers (SROs) worked in 1,088 schools (55%), school security officers (SSOs) worked in 476 schools (24%), and private security personnel worked in 18 schools (1%). Safety/security personnel working full-time or part-time were reported by 45% of elementary schools, 97% of middle schools, 96% of high schools, and 63% of other types of schools.
- The estimated number of individuals working as SROs/SSOs statewide based on information reported by the schools was 886 individuals working as SROs and 898 individuals working as SSOs.
- Most schools with SROs (87%) reported that their school division had a current memorandum of understanding (MOU) with their local law enforcement agency for the placement of SROs in division schools.
- Few schools with SROs (12%) reported that the principal or assistant principal was part of the SRO selection process.
- The majority of schools (70%) agree that teachers would benefit from more training about the roles of SROs in schools.
- Overall, 24% of the schools activated some portion of their school's crisis management plan during the 2018–2019 school year due to an actual critical event or emergency. The rate was highest among middle schools (30%) and lowest among other schools (21%).
- Two-thirds of schools (66%) reported that local first responders have electronic/internet-based access to current floor plans for the school in case they need to respond to a large-scale security incident.
- Most schools (79%) provided advanced notice to faculty and staff about upcoming drills. Just over half of schools (55%) provided advanced notice to students.
- Most schools (81%) reported that first responders have access to the school building during a lockdown so they do not have to breach doors or windows to gain access.
- Seventy-five percent of schools reported that school administrators can communicate with law enforcement/first responders via radio when they are inside the school building. This is an increase over last year when it was 65% of schools.
- The 303 schools that cannot communicate via radio with first responders cited radio system compatibility as the primary issue (80%).
- Most schools reported having the following security strategies in place: locked exterior entrances (96%), controlled access system at the main entrance (95%), and designated reunification sites (92%).

## 2019 VIRGINIA SCHOOL AND DIVISION SAFETY SURVEY RESULTS

- The median size of school threat assessment teams was five members. Over 70% of the members statewide had expertise as either administrators or counselors.
- Overall, 66% of those persons serving as a threat assessment team member at their school received threat assessment training in the past three years.
- Most schools (85%) reported that their threat assessment team met at least once during the 2018–2019 school year. The average number of threat assessment team meetings among all schools was 6.7 for the year; the median number was three.
- Threat assessment case records were most frequently stored with school administrator’s files (63%) or at the division’s central office (29%).
- Fewer than half of schools (41%) reported having a web-based, anonymous text or tip line (for use with computer or smartphone) for reporting threats/aberrant behavior.
- Seventy-eight percent of schools reported conducting one or more threat assessments in 2018–2019. A total of 16,573 threat assessments were conducted by all schools.
- In most of the threat assessments that were conducted, a current student of the school was the subject of the threat assessment (98%).
- Of the 16,573 threat assessments conducted, 60% involved threats to self only (self-harm, suicide), 36% involved threats to others only, and 5% involved threats to self and others.
- Of the 1,169 threats (9%) that were classified as a highest-level threat (imminent/high risk, very serious substantive) at some point in the threat assessment process, 38 resulted in an act occurring. Of these 38, 61% were suicide attempts or self-harm.
- The top three types of school safety training reported as most needed by the schools’ administration, faculty, and/or staff were mental health problem awareness and recognition (70%), de-escalation and mediation (63%), and social/emotional interventions and supports (59%). The top two were the same as last year.
- Few schools (20%) reported having someone at the school administration level specifically responsible for monitoring social media to detect and mitigate potential threats and other safety issues.
- Each school was asked to identify the primary issue affecting the physical safety and well-being of students and staff at their school. The top three identified were the same for both groups (students and staff): lack of designated security personnel (23% and 23%), lack of fencing or other peripheral security (16% and 15%, respectively), and multiple building/portable classrooms (13% and 13%).
- Each school was asked to identify the primary issue affecting the mental/emotional safety and well-being of students and staff at their school. Again, the top three identified were the same for both groups (students and staff): unmet mental health needs/limited mental health resources (53% and 35%, respectively), lack of counseling personnel for students (12% and 11%, respectively), and counseling personnel tasked with non-mental health-related assignments (9% and 8%, respectively).

## Findings from the Division Survey

- There were 132 responses from school superintendents or their designees to the 2018–2019 division survey. All divisions (100%) complied with the requirement to complete the survey.
- Statewide, divisions employed 4,440 full-time and 142 part-time, school-based mental health professionals hired by the school divisions to serve specific schools or a combination of schools. Mental health services were also provided by 1,386 full-time and 79 part-time day treatment program counselors, and by 526 full-time and 66 part-time counselors that worked in the schools through a memorandum of understanding with a community agency.
- There were two divisions that reported they had no full-time or part-time mental health professionals and two other divisions reported having no full-time mental health professionals.
- Eighty divisions (61%) employ a Director of School Safety or Director of School Security (or person of similar title whose responsibility is the oversight of school safety-related activities).
- In most divisions (85%), the role of Emergency Manager was assumed in addition to someone’s primary position. Few divisions (5%) employ someone for whom Emergency Manager is their primary role.
- Most divisions (119, 90%) have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in place to facilitate the partnership between schools and law enforcement. Eighty-five of these divisions provide information to all of their schools about the MOU with law enforcement.
- Nearly all divisions (96%) had SROs working at some of their division’s schools, 29% had SSOs working at some of their division’s schools, and two divisions had private security working at some schools in their division. Four divisions reported having none of these working at their division’s schools.
- Divisions reported that 77% of SROs were funded locally. Of the 127 divisions with SROs, 45% reported SROs were funded by the local law enforcement agency (LEA), 7% were funded by the school division, and 25% were funded through a combination of division and LEA funds.
- Thirty divisions (23%) reported applying for SRO grant funds last year, 91 divisions (69%) did not, and 11 divisions (8%) did not know.
- The 91 divisions that *did not* apply for SRO funds last year were asked the reason(s) why they did not. Of these, the majority (67%) said that their SROs were not eligible since they were supported with local funding.
- Of the 38 divisions with SSOs, 74% were supervised at the school level by the principal/administrator, 26% were supervised at the division level.
- The 38 divisions that reported having SSOs, reported their division’s current policy on allowing SSOs to be armed as follows: 32 divisions (84%) do not allow SSOs to be armed in schools and are not considering changing this policy in the near future, three divisions (8%) allow SSOs to be armed, and one division does not currently allow SSOs to be armed but is considering allowing it.
- Most divisions have formal written processes or protocols that direct receiving notification on certain Code listed offenses from law enforcement (77% of divisions), and for providing notification on the same to law enforcement when committed by students (87% of divisions).
- Fourteen divisions (11%) require their schools to conduct additional lockdown drills besides the four lockdown drills required in *Virginia Code § 22.1-137.2*.
- Seventy-seven divisions (58%) reported conducting additional exercises with law enforcement/first responders. Most were described as full-scale drills (48%) or table top simulations (40%).
- Most divisions (108, 82%) do not have a policy to provide advanced notice of upcoming drills/exercises to students, parents, or faculty/staff. Twenty-three divisions (17%) have a policy that addresses at least one of these groups, most often faculty/staff.
- The top two recommendations for physical safety improvements submitted to school boards by the divisions were additional security cameras (16% of divisions) and access control systems (14%). Need for additional personnel, fencing/peripheral controls, and lock upgrades were tied for third with 7% each.

## 2019 VIRGINIA SCHOOL AND DIVISION SAFETY SURVEY RESULTS

- Ninety divisions (68%) reported having oversight committees for their schools' threat assessment teams. Most of these committees included principals/assistant principals (83%), three-quarters included law enforcement (77%), and two-thirds included school psychologists/other licensed clinicians (67%).
- Most divisions (113, 86%) have a written process/policy for notifying local law enforcement or other institutions when a threat is made by students or non-students. Fourteen divisions (11%) said there were no obstacles and communication occurs regularly, however, a written policy is not currently in place. Five divisions (4%) said that concerns about privacy laws were an obstacle.
- Just over half of divisions (52%) have a division-wide, web-based anonymous text or tip line for reporting threatening or aberrant behavior.
- Most divisions (110, 83%) reported storing threat assessment records with school administrators' files, while just under half (58, 44%) reported these records were stored at the Central (division) office.
- Training and education related to aberrant behavior for faculty/staff was provided by the schools in most divisions (70%). Fifty-six percent of divisions offered this training as division-wide school safety in-service training.
- The top challenges reported by divisions in setting up teams or conducting threat assessments were team coordination/scheduling (40%), limited staff and staff turnover/retention (39%), training for new staff and team members (39%), and determining level of threat (39%).
- Training for new staff (63%), level of threat/when to conduct a threat assessment (62%), and case studies/scenario training (59%) were cited most often as the types of training that would help improve divisions' threat assessment processes.
- Divisions' primary issue concerning the physical safety and well-being of their students and staff was schools with multiple buildings/portable classrooms.
- Divisions' primary issue concerning the mental/emotional safety and well-being of students and staff was unmet mental health needs/limited mental health resources in the community.
- Two-thirds of divisions (67%) reported having no specific process for monitoring social media to detect and mitigate potential threats and other safety issues, 16% reported someone at the division level is responsible, and 9% have contracted with a cybersecurity company to monitor social media for them.

## II. INTRODUCTION

Since 1997, state law has required all public schools to conduct school safety audits ([§ 22.1-279.8](#)). The purpose is to assess the safety conditions within individual schools and at the division level, as applicable, identify and develop solutions for physical safety concerns, and identify and evaluate patterns of student safety concerns. Based on the results of the audit, in combination with a review of the other components of the School Safety Audit Program, schools and divisions can develop responses and solutions to identified vulnerabilities, which may include recommendations for structural adjustments, changes to safety procedures, and/or revisions to the student code of conduct.

To date, the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety (VCSCS) has developed five components for the School Safety Audit Program:

- Virginia School Safety Survey (annually)
- School Division Level Survey (annually)
- Virginia School Crisis Management Plan Review and Certification (annually)
- Virginia Secondary School Climate Survey (administered in spring; for more information, link to [www.dcjs.virginia.gov/virginia-center-school-and-campus-safety/school-safety-survey/secondary-school-climate-survey](http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/virginia-center-school-and-campus-safety/school-safety-survey/secondary-school-climate-survey), which also has links to the Climate Survey Technical Reports for 2013–2018)
- The School Safety Inspection Checklist for Virginia Public Schools (due in 2020, every three years)

The DCJS Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety, in consultation with the Virginia Department of Education, is responsible for developing the list of items to be reviewed and evaluated in the school safety audits required by the *Code of Virginia*, as well as a standardized report format for school safety audits, additional reporting criteria, and procedures for report submission. School safety data for the annual School Safety Audit Program has been collected by the VCSCS since 2005.

The survey is updated each year to maintain its relevance. Changes to the school safety survey(s) are made in anticipation of emerging best practices and to gather data to inform policymakers. All data are available to school divisions to inform their practices and guide decision making regarding student and staff safety. However, the *Code of Virginia* allows for some, or all of the data, to be protected from release to the public for safety and security reasons.

# III. SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The Virginia School Safety Survey is conducted annually and collects information about safety-related issues and practices in individual schools and divisions. The survey includes questions about safety and mental health personnel, school crisis planning, best practices and security strategies, threat assessment practices, and school climate.

All of the 1,961 public schools operating<sup>1</sup> in Virginia during the 2018–2019 school year completed the survey, providing 100% compliance in the School Safety Audit Program. The schools represent all of Virginia’s 132 school divisions, the Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice Division of Education, as well as Virginia’s Academic-Year Governor’s Schools, Regional Alternative Education Programs, Regional Career and Technical Programs, and the Virginia School for the Deaf and the Blind.

School survey findings are organized by the following categories: School Identification and Demographics; Safety-Related Personnel and Partnerships; Emergency Planning, Drills, and Response; Threat Reporting and Assessments; and Concerns, Training, and Resource Needs. Throughout this report, findings reflect the 2018–2019 school year and statistics reflect 1,961 schools unless otherwise noted.

School division survey findings follow and are organized by the following categories: Safety-Related Personnel and Partnerships; Emergency Planning, Drills, and Response; Threat Reporting and Assessments; and Concerns, Training, and Resource Needs.

Copies of the survey instruments are located in Appendix B.

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<sup>1</sup> For purposes of this survey, DCJS defined “school” as any separate physical structure that houses and instructs public school students during school hours. This is different from the Virginia Department of Education’s (VDOE’s) definition and is why their count of the number of schools is different. VDOE defines a school as “a publicly funded institution where students are enrolled for all or a majority of the instructional day; those students are reported in fall membership at the institution and the institution, at minimum, meets requirements adopted by the Board of Education.”

# IV. FINDINGS FROM THE 2018–2019 VIRGINIA SCHOOL SAFETY SURVEY

## 1. SCHOOL IDENTIFICATION AND DEMOGRAPHICS

### Types of Schools

Schools were asked to describe their school and provide their fall enrollment number for 2018.

#### Q. Which of the following best describes your school?

There were 1,961 responses to the 2018–2019 school safety survey received from Virginia’s public schools. All schools (100%) complied with the requirement to complete the survey. Schools identified themselves as follows:

School type	Number	Percent	School type	Number	Percent
Elementary	1085	55%	Special Education	16	1%
Middle	344	18%	Other	7	<1%
High	306	16%	Governor’s	6	<1%
Alternative	45	2%	Charter	4	<1%
Career/Technical/Vocational	42	2%	Magnet	5	<1%
Combined Grades	36	2%	Correctional Education	1	<1%
Primary	33	2%	School for Deaf and Blind	1	<1%
Pre-Kindergarten	30	2%	Adult Ed	0	0%


For purposes of more detailed analyses throughout this report, schools were coded as elementary, middle, high, or other. This distinction was based on their grade levels and/or purpose, as follows:

- Elementary Typically grades K–5 but may include grade 6 (if school has grades K–7, it was coded as “other”). Elementary also includes intermediate schools which are typically grades 3–5 or grades 4–6, and also includes primary schools which are typically grades K–2.
- Middle Typically grades 6–8 but may include grade 9. A few schools have grades 4–7 and a few have only grades 5 and 6, or only grades 8 and 9.
- High Typically grades 9–12 but may include grade 8.
- Other This includes all schools that do not fit into the above categories, such as combined schools, and others that have a specific purpose, such as pre-K, alternative, technical, special education, correctional education, adult education, and school for deaf and blind.

*Note: Governor’s schools, magnet schools, and charter schools were coded according to their grade levels.*

Using this coding scheme, elementary schools (N = 1,122) represented 57% of the schools, middle schools (N = 345) represented 18%, high schools (N = 316) represented 16%, and other schools (N = 178) represented 9% of the schools.

Chart 1: Types of Schools 2018-2019 (coded)



## Enrollment

### Q. What was your fall membership enrollment number on September 30, 2018?

Generally, schools with the largest enrollments are high schools, while other schools and elementary schools have smaller enrollments. The school with the largest enrollment in 2018–2019 was a combined school that included grades 7–12 with an enrollment of 4,285 students.

Table 2: School Enrollment, by Type of School					
Enrollment range	Number of schools by type				Total
	Elem	Middle	High	Other	
0	0	0	0	1%	<1%
1–50	0	<1%	0	16%	2%
51–250	8%	4%	5%	39%	10%
251–500	36%	20%	13%	23%	28%
501–1000	54%	46%	24%	16%	44%
1001–1500	2%	26%	22%	2%	9%
1501–2000	0	3%	21%	0	4%
2001–2500	0	0	11%	0	2%
2501–3000	0	0	3%	1%	1%
3001+	0	0	<1%	2%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%


Two schools reported an enrollment of 0.

## 2. SAFETY-RELATED PERSONNEL AND PARTNERSHIPS

### Mental Health Professionals

**Q. What was the number of full-time and part-time school-based mental health personnel (counselor, psychologist, social worker, substance abuse counselor) who allocated at least 50% of their employed time providing mental health services to students in your school in 2018–2019?**

Most schools (88%) reported having at least one full-time (FT) and a majority (58%) have at least one part-time (PT) mental health (MH) professional. While most schools (94%) reported having at least one full-time and/or part-time mental health professional, 114 schools (6%) reported having no mental health professionals at all.



The statewide average of mental health professionals per school differed based on full-time or part-time status.

- **FT mental health professional:** 2.40 per school average
- **PT mental health professional:** 1.05 per school average

#### Rate of mental health professionals per 1,000 students

The rate of MH professionals per 1,000 students was calculated for 1,783 elementary, middle, and high schools using their reported number of full-time or part-time MH personnel and each school’s fall enrollment number. Other schools were left out of this analysis due to their relatively low enrollments, which skew the data. The statewide rates were as follows:

- **FT mental health professional:** 3.67 per 1,000 students enrolled
- **PT mental health professional:** 1.99 per 1,000 students enrolled

Reviewing the rates by type of school show elementary schools with the lowest rate for full-time, and high schools with the lowest rate for part-time MH professionals.

	Rate per 1,000 students enrolled			
	Elementary N = 1,122	Middle N = 345	High N = 316	Total N = 1783
FT MH professional	3.17	4.68	4.35	3.67
PT MH professional	2.34	1.75	1.01	1.99

## Safety-Related Personnel

**Q. Did you have safety/security personnel such as School Resource Officers (SROs), Certified School Security Officers (SSOs), or contracted private security personnel working at your school during the 2018–2019 school year?**

Sixty-four percent of schools (1,254) reported having either school resource officers (SROs), school security officers (SSOs), or private security personnel working at their school either full-time or part-time.

### Private security personnel

- 18 schools (1%) reported that private security personnel regularly worked at their school during normal school hours.
- The range in the number of private security personnel working at each of these 23 schools were 1 to 12.

### School resource officers and school security officers


[§ 9.1-101](#) defines school resource officers and school security officers:

*“School resource officer” means a certified law enforcement officer hired by the local law enforcement agency to provide law enforcement and security services to Virginia public elementary and secondary schools.*


*“Certified school security officer” means an individual who is employed by the local school board for the singular purpose of maintaining order and discipline, preventing crime, investigating violations of school board policies, and detaining students violating the law or school board policies on school property or at school-sponsored events and who is responsible solely for ensuring the safety, security, and welfare of all students, faculty, staff, and visitors in the assigned school.*

- 1,088 schools have one or more SROs working at least part-time
- 476 schools have one or more SSOs working at least part-time
- SSOs were typically supervised at the school level (66%), less so at the division level (34%)

**Chart 3: School Resource Officers in Schools**




**Chart 4: School Security Officers in Schools**



Schools that reported having either SROs or SSOs were asked to provide information about the number of officers, whether officers worked at the school full-time or part-time, and officers’ names and contact information. Among all schools, it was found that more schools have SROs than SSOs (SROs worked in 55% of all schools, SSOs worked in 24% of all schools). However, among the individual SROs working in the schools, 72% worked full-time while 91% of individual SSOs working in the schools worked full-time.

Examining the use of either full-time or part-time SROs by type of school, it was found that most middle and high schools have SROs working in the schools (both were 95%), while one-third of elementary schools (33%) have them. Nearly half of other school types (49%) have SROs.

**Chart 5: Use of SROs/SSOs, by Type of School**



The number of individuals working as SROs/SSOs statewide was estimated based on the names and contact information provided by the schools for each person in these positions (schools provided name/contact information for up to five SROs and for up to ten SSOs). By category, duplicate names/emails within a division were counted as one individual working in multiple schools. (One school reported 14 SSOs, so this count may be short by four SSOs.)

Table 4: Number of Security Personnel and Range in Number Reported				
Type of security personnel	Range in number of security personnel reported	2018–2019 Total security personnel reported statewide	2017–2018 Total security personnel reported statewide	Percent change
SRO	0.15 – 5	886 named individuals	764 named individuals	+16%
SSO	1 – 14	898 named individuals	836 named individuals	+7%

**School Resource Officers – Additional Information**

The 1,081 schools that reported having one or more SROs during the 2018–2019 school year were asked additional questions about how the school works with SROs, staff training on the role(s) of SROs, and training that would enhance the SRO’s role in the school. (The seven schools that reported having a fraction of an SRO position were not asked these additional questions.)

**Q. In 2018–2019, did your school division have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with local law enforcement for the placement of school resource officers (SROs) in your school division?** (N = 1081)

- Most schools with SROs (941, 87%) reported that their school division does have a current MOU, 14% didn’t know, and 1% of schools do not have a current MOU. The number of schools reporting MOUs is up from 85% in the previous year.

The 941 schools with current MOUs were asked:

**Q. How familiar are you (the principal) with the roles and expectations set out in the MOU?**

The majority of schools (74%) report being either extremely or moderately familiar with the expectations set out in the MOU. This is up from 66% in 2017–2018.


Table 5: Familiarity with Roles and Expectations in MOU (N = 941)		
	Number of schools	Percentage of schools with SROs
Extremely familiar	312	33%
Moderately familiar	384	41%
Somewhat familiar	149	16%
Slightly familiar	70	7%
Not at all familiar	26	3%

**Q. For the most recently assigned SRO at your school, was the principal or assistant principal part of the selection process?** (N = 1081)

- Most schools (921, 85%) reported that neither the principal nor assistant principal were part of the SRO selection process. Twelve percent (131 schools) were part of the selection process, while 29 schools (3%) reported “other.” Of those, most schools (28) said they didn’t know, 21 of those because the SRO was already there when they were assigned to the school. One school said that the SRO was assigned by the district.

**Q. Do you agree that teachers would benefit from more training about the role of the SROs in your school?** (N = 1081)

**Chart 6: Teachers Would Benefit from Training about SROs**



The majority of schools (70%) agree or strongly agree that teachers would benefit from more training about the role of the SROs.

### 3. EMERGENCY PLANNING, DRILLS, AND RESPONSE

#### School Crisis/Emergency Management/Medical Response Plan

*Virginia Code § 22.1-279.8* describes school crisis and emergency management plans and states that “each school board shall ensure that every school that it supervises shall develop a written school crisis, emergency management, and medical response plan.”

#### Activation of Crisis Management Plans

**Q. Did you have to activate any portion of your school’s crisis management plan during the 2018–2019 school year due to an actual critical event or emergency?**

Table 6: Activation of Crisis Management Plan			
	2018–2019	2017–2018	2016–2017
<b>All schools</b>	<b>474 schools (24%)</b>	<b>574 schools (29%)</b>	<b>524 schools (27%)</b>
Elementary	244 schools (22%)	260 schools (24%)	258 schools (23%)
Middle	103 schools (30%)	132 schools (39%)	104 schools (31%)
High	89 schools (28%)	131 schools (42%)	112 schools (35%)
Other	38 schools (21%)	51 schools (26%)	50 schools (25%)

Overall, 24% of schools activated some portion of their school’s crisis management plan in 2018–2019. Activations were down from 29% in 2017–2018 and 27% in 2016–2017.

## Safety-Related Conditions

Schools were asked about various safety-related conditions, best practices, and security strategies at their school.

### Electronic/internet-based access to current floor plans

**Q. Did first responders (police/fire/EMS) have electronic/internet-based access to current floor plans for your school in case they needed to respond to a large-scale security incident at your facility?**


- 1,297 (66%) Yes (down from 68% in 2017–2018)
- 234 (12%) No
- 430 (22%) Don't know

First responder access to floor plans was somewhat consistent across most school types, and higher among high schools: Elementary 65%, Middle 65%, High 73%, and Other 63%.

### Advance notice of exercises/drills

**Q. Did your school inform students, parents, and/or faculty and staff in advance about upcoming exercises/drills (lockdown, fire, shelter-in-place, etc.)?**

Most schools (79%) provided advanced notice to faculty/staff, just over half (55%) provided advanced notice to students. Only about one-quarter (26%) provide such notice to the parents of students.



The schools that indicated they provided advanced notice were asked how much notice was given.

#### Faculty/staff provided with advanced notice (N = 1550)

- 24 hours or more 968 schools (62%)
- Informed immediately prior to 245 schools (16%)
- Other 338 schools (22%)

#### Parents provided with advanced notice (N = 519)

- 24 hours or more 279 schools (54%)
- Informed immediately prior to 80 schools (15%)
- Other 160 schools (31%)

**Students provided with advanced notice (N = 1074)**

- 24 hours or more 404 schools (38%)
- Informed immediately prior to 466 schools (43%)
- Other 204 schools (19%)

Of the 204 “other” responses regarding the advanced notice to students:

- Fifty-four schools said it depends on the type of drill. Advance notice given for some types of drills
- Forty-eight schools said that notice is provided for the first drill/drills of the school year
- Forty-six schools provided notice by another time interval (26 provided notice in the morning the day of; 14 provided a week’s notice – some only at start of school year; six described two weeks to a month’s notice)
- Forty-three schools did not provide notice but instead discussed drill policy and schedules in a handbook, newsletter, or an assembly
- Eight schools described other conditions, such as, providing advance notice for some classes/students or providing teachers with discretion on whether to inform their students prior to a drill
- Five schools did not provide notice, but instead, students practiced with their teacher

**Lockdown access**

**Q. Did first responders have access to the school during a lockdown so they would not have to breach doors or windows to gain access, if necessary?**

- Yes 1,592 (81%, same as in 2017–2018)
- No 156 (8%)
- Don’t know 213 (11%)

First responder access to the school building was highest among high schools but consistently high across all school types: Elementary 78%, Middle 85%, High 89%, and Other 81%.

**Radio communication**


**Q. Could school administrators communicate with law enforcement/first responders via radio when they are inside the school building during an emergency or critical incident, if necessary?**

- Yes 1,478 (75%, up from 65% in 2017–2018)
- No 303 (15%)
- Don’t know 180 (9%)

(Percentage total does not equal 100% due to rounding.)

Radio communication was higher among middle and high schools: Elementary 72%, Middle 80%, High 84%, and Other 74%. All reported increases over 2017–2018.

**Chart 8: Increase in Radio Communication between School Administration and First Responders in 2018–2019**



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The 303 schools that responded that there was no radio communication between school administrators and first responders were asked what prevented it. The primary issue was that schools and first responders use different types of radio equipment/systems. This was described as compatibility issues or use of different radio signals, frequencies, or systems, suggesting that school radio systems are for use internally to communicate among staff and administration, not with emergency responders. Some schools (17) noted that their SRO can communicate with first responders via radio while they cannot.

Number of schools	What prevents radio communication between administration and emergency responders
241	Radio system compatibility problem
26	Protocol issues (used cell phones to communicate, instructed not to use radios during emergency, SRO not issued a school radio)
20	Equipment-related problems (no radios, don't work, not available, not enough)
6	Unavailable (not explained – could mean no access to first responder radio systems)
3	Reception problems/dead zones in building
7	Other/Don't know

Security strategies

**Q. Review the following list of security strategies and select those that were in place at your school during the 2018–2019 school year.**

Most schools reported having locked exterior entrances (96%), controlled access system at the main entrance (95%, up from 88% in 2017–2018), designated reunification sites (92%), and a checklist to use when a threatening communication is received (89%). Just over half of schools reported having classrooms that can lock from both inside and outside (60%), and having someone stationed at the front entrance of the school (60%, up from 55% in 2017–2018).

	Number of schools	Percentage of schools
All exterior entrances locked during school hours	1,891	96%
Main entrance secured by controlled access system	1,867	95%
Designated reunification site	1,796	92%
Threatening communication checklist	1,736	89%
Classrooms can lock from both inside and outside	1,182	60%
Front entrance had someone stationed to direct visitors	1,172	60%
None of the above	1	<1%
Other	53	3%

(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

Of the schools that described additional “other” security strategies: locking of classrooms: locked at all times, only from inside, always when door closed, only from outside, magnetic lock strips (14); restriction of unauthorized personnel: visitor check in system, front entrance monitored (observation/Airphone), staff wear ID badges, use of delivery window, technology to close off main corridor if needed, security monitor at entrance during start of school, security doors between office/check in area and rest of school building (12); use of security cameras around the school (9); emergency protocols: crisis plans, staff trained in, crisis case/emergency backpack to take off-site (8); communication for emergencies: numbered exterior exits, radios/walkie-talkies (4); general security: security patrols, staff stationed at bus/student drop-off area (3); unclear response (3).

4. THREAT REPORTING AND ASSESSMENTS

Threat Assessment Team

Virginia Code § 22.1-79.4 states that “Each division superintendent shall establish, for each school, a threat assessment team that shall include persons with expertise in counseling, instruction, school administration, and law enforcement.”

Team membership and training

Q. How many members did your school’s threat assessment team (TAT) have in 2018–2019? Provide the area of expertise and training status for each team member.

Schools reported a total of 12,540 threat assessment team (TAT) members.

Table 8: Number of Threat Assessment Team Members			
Number of TAT Members	Number of Schools	Number of TAT Members	Number of Schools
0	51	11	32
1	8	12	50
2	38	13	23
3	157	14	15
4	301	15	19
5	432	16	7
6	302	17	9
7	167	18	11
8	156	19	3
9	65	20	4
10	99	Over 20	12

The 51 schools that reported their school’s threat assessment team had zero members included, by school type: 27 elementary, 5 middle, 3 high, and 16 other schools.

Overall Range in number of threat assessment team members: 0–150 members  
 Median number of threat assessment team members: 5 members  
 Mean (average) number of threat assessment team members: 6.4 members

While there were 12,540 threat assessment team members reported, additional information was collected for 11,571 of the members (for up to 10 team members per school). Among the information collected was the TAT members’ area of expertise.


Table 9: Threat Assessment Team Members – Expertise and Threat Assessment Training						
Number	Area of Expertise					Total
	Administrator	Counselor	Instructor	Law Enforcement	Other	
	4141 (36%)	4073 (35%)	1169 (10%)	1134 (10%)	1054 (9%)	11571 (100%)
Completed training in the past 3 years?						
Yes	3048 (74%)	2872 (70%)	479 (41%)	784 (69%)	412 (32%)	7595 (66%)
No	503 (12%)	219 (5%)	295 (25%)	28 (2%)	246 (19%)	1291 (11%)
Don’t know	590 (14%)	982 (24%)	395 (34%)	322 (28%)	396 (31%)	2685 (23%)

There were more administrators (36%) and counselors (35%) reported as TAT members than instructors (10%) and law enforcement (10%). Schools also reported a majority of administrators (74%), counselors (70%), and law enforcement (69%) as recently trained in threat assessment, while fewer than half of instructors (41%) had recent training. Overall, about two-thirds (66%) of all TAT members were reported as trained in threat assessment the past three years.

It is required that schools’ threat assessment teams include members that represent each of four areas of expertise: administration, counseling, instruction, and law enforcement. There were 307 schools (16%) that reported having all four areas of expertise represented on their team.

Administration was the most represented of the four expertise areas (95% of schools reported their TAT had at least one administration representative).

**Chart 9: Areas of Expertise Represented on School’s Threat Assessment Team**



**Meeting frequency**

**Q. Approximately how many times did the threat assessment team meet in 2018–2019? (A meeting includes at least two members conferring about a threat assessment matter.)**

Schools reported a total of 12,807 threat assessment team meetings. (Reported by 1,910 schools.)

- Range in number of meetings reported: 0–162
- Number of schools reported 0 meetings: 252
- Median number of meetings: 3
- Mean number of meetings: 6.7


The 1,658 schools that reported conducting one or more threat assessment team meetings were asked:

**Q. Of the threat assessment team meetings conducted, estimate the number of meetings where representatives from all four areas of expertise attended.**

Schools reported representatives from all four areas of expertise attended a total of 5,437 meetings (42%). (N = 1651 because 7 responses were unclear.)

- Range of meetings reported where reps from all four areas of expertise attended: 0–96
- Number of schools that reported reps from all four areas of expertise attended 0 meetings: 515
- Median number of meetings with reps from all four areas: 2
- Mean number of meetings with reps from all four areas: 3.3

**Chart 10: Number of Threat Assessment Meetings, per School**



**Information about threat assessment teams**

**Q. In 2018–2019, how did your school inform students about threat assessment teams and their role in the school?**

**Q. In 2018–2019, how did your school inform faculty and staff about threat assessment teams and their role in the school?**

Just over two-fifths of the schools (41%) did not inform students about threat assessment teams and their role in the school. Of those that did, students were most frequently provided with this information via the Code of Conduct or student handbook (41%).

A few schools (7%) did not inform faculty and staff about threat assessment teams and their role in the school. Most schools provided this information in an assembly or meeting (65%) and about half of schools (54%) provided this information in the Code of Conduct or staff/faculty handbook.

**Table 10: Informing Students and Faculty/Staff about Threat Assessment Teams**

Students		Information Methods	Faculty/Staff	
Number of schools	Percentage of schools		Number of schools	Percentage of schools
824	42%	Code of Conduct, student or staff/faculty handbook, policy	1078	55%
487	25%	Assembly, classroom, faculty/staff meeting	1352	69%
136	7%	Website/social media	98	5%
69	4%	Email/text	299	15%
91	5%	Other written format (brochure, letter)	142	7%
805	41%	Did not inform	150	8%
95	5%	Other	88	4%

(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

The 41% of schools that did not inform students about threat assessment teams included: 45% of elementary schools, 37% of middle schools, 30% of high schools, and 39% of other school types.

Of the schools that selected “other” as the method to inform **students** about threat assessment teams: students informed as needed (situational, if student is part of threat assessment process) (60); part of counselor lesson/presentation (13); video presentation (part of safety/mental health video) (5); discussed with drills (2); don’t know (6); not applicable (7); other (SR&R Review, MHFA) (2).

Of the schools that said they used an “other” method to inform **faculty/staff** about threat assessment teams: faculty/staff informed as needed (situational, if part of threat assessment process) (40); part of training, professional development, workshop, module (24); part of school crisis plan (12); video presentation (part of safety/mental health video) (4); discussed with drills (2); don’t know (2); not applicable (1); other (3).


**Record Keeping**

**Storage**

**Q. Where were threat assessment records (such as Student Threat Assessment and Response Reports) stored during 2018–2019?**

Threat assessment case records were most frequently stored with the school administrators’ files (63%).

**Chart 11: Storage of Threat Assessment Case Records**



(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

Nearly half of the schools (211) that provided a response to “other,” said that threat assessment case records were stored in the school’s counselor/guidance office. Other locations where these records were stored included: student file/student record (54), student cumulative file (47), electronic/online file (42), in the main office (20), in a file/records room/vault (12), with the school psychologist (9), in the student discipline file (9), Ed plan (6), health file (6), threat assessment team file (6), with the social worker’s files (5), with a security office/SRO (3), and other (22).

Some schools said the threat assessment case record was inside an envelope marked “confidential” inside a file, or that files were kept locked. Some schools noted that transient threat records and highest-level threat records were stored in different locations.

### Threat-related Training for Faculty and Staff

**Q. What mechanisms were in place to make faculty and staff aware of threat assessment protocols and how to recognize threatening or aberrant behavior?**

Many schools (81%) reported providing information to their faculty and staff about threat assessment protocols and recognizing aberrant behavior at staff meetings, but only about half (48%) provided in-service training.


Table 11: Informing Faculty/Staff about Threat Assessment and Aberrant Behavior		
Awareness efforts	Number of schools	Percentage of schools
Information provided at staff meetings	1579	81%
Information provided at back-to-school meetings	1001	51%
In-service training	941	48%
Required online training video	486	25%
Other	117	6%
None	61	3%

(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

Other responses included: training, some described as optional, as needed, or for select staff (25 schools); written information in safety/crisis/emergency plans (20); written information in handbook/manual/policy (19); provided in a written format (11); information provided as needed (8); in informal conversation (8); in meetings with counselor, safety/crisis team, with social worker, with SRO (8); in an email (5); in drills (4); none or N/A (4); other (5).

### Threat Reporting

Fewer than half of the schools overall (797, 41%) reported having a web-based, anonymous text or tip line (for use with computer or smartphone) for reporting threats/aberrant behavior. See Chart 12 for the percentage of schools by type that reported having this type of text/tip line.



### Threat Assessments Conducted in 2018–2019

In addition to requiring the establishment of threat assessment teams, *Virginia Code § 22.1-79.4* also instructs that “each threat assessment team established pursuant to this section shall report quantitative data on its activities according to guidance developed by the Department of Criminal Justice Services.”

**Information to provide context to the “numbers of threat assessment” data discussed in this report**

Schools were asked to report the number of threat assessment cases conducted at their school in a given school year. However, it is important to understand that there is great variance among schools as to what constitutes a threat. Schools have a lot of autonomy in deciding when a threat assessment (TA) should be conducted. A school that reports conducting no TAs may just have a higher threshold for conducting one. What one school classifies as “minor” may not rise to that level at another school. Additionally, although the purpose of threat assessment is to assess a threat before an act takes place, it seems some schools conduct threat assessments on acts after they have occurred. While this process is really more of a debrief and a chance to investigate the event to inform the discipline process, it is also an opportunity to be certain the event was a singular act and not part of a larger threat.

Furthermore, the threat assessment process is complex and still relatively new. As such, schools are still learning the process and any increase from year to year should not be seen as a “spike” in threats. An increase may only reflect that the schools are becoming better trained/more efficient with the threat assessment process.

**Number conducted**


Schools were asked to provide information about the number of threat assessment cases conducted at their school.

***In 2018–2019, 1,538 schools (78%) reported conducting one or more threat assessments for a total of 16,573 threat assessments conducted.***

This year, fewer schools reported more threat assessments than in 2017–2018 when 1,562 schools reported conducting a total of 14,869 threat assessments.

**Threat assessments conducted, by type of school**

Relative to the percentage of schools in each “school type,” middle and high schools conducted more threat assessments when compared to elementary schools and other types of schools.



- Elementary schools represent 57% of all schools, by type. Of the 1122 elementary schools, 848 (76%) reported conducting 6,885 TAs. This was 42% of all TAs conducted.
- Middle schools represent 18% of all schools, by type. Of the 345 middle schools, 317 (92%) reported conducting 5,115 TAs. This was 31% of all TAs conducted.
- High schools represent 16% of all schools, by type. Of the 316 high schools, 285 (90%) reported conducting 3,846 TAs. This was 23% of all TAs conducted.
- Other types of schools represent 9% of all schools, by type. Of the 178 other schools, 88 (49%) reported conducting 727 TAs. This was 4% of all TAs conducted.

Examining threat assessment rates “per 1,000 students” (based on schools’ reported fall enrollment) provides another perspective. Middle schools show the highest rate overall of all threats assessed, 19.0 threat assessments per 1,000 students, while other schools show the highest rate of highest-level threats assessed, 1.5 per 1,000 students.

Table 12: Threat Assessment Rates, by School Type		
School type	Threat assessment rate per 1,000 students	
	All threats assessed	Highest-level threats assessed
All schools	12.6	0.9
Elementary	11.5	0.5
Middle	19.0	1.2
High	10.1	1.1
Other	11.2	1.5

**Schools that conducted no threat assessments**

Overall, 423 schools (22% of all schools) reported conducting no threat assessments in 2018–2019. By school type,

- 274 elementary schools (24% of elementary schools)
- 28 middle schools (8% of middle schools)
- 31 high schools (10% of high schools)
- 90 other schools (51% of other schools)

**Subject of assessment**

Schools were also asked to report the number of threat assessments conducted based on the subject of the assessment(s).

**Q. Of the threat assessment cases conducted at your school in 2018–2019, how many cases involved threats made by persons from each of the following groups?**

“Students from your school” (which represents students enrolled in the school during 2018–2019) were the subjects of 98% of all threat assessments conducted. This percentage is consistent with data from previous years.

Number of Threat Assessment Cases, by Subject of Assessment	
Subject of assessment	Number of TAs conducted
Student from your school	16,243
Student not from your school	79
Student formerly from your school	31
Faculty/staff currently employed by your school	113
Faculty/staff formerly employed by your school	11
Parent/guardian of a student	71
Someone else <sup>2</sup>	25
Total	16,573

<sup>2</sup> Of the 25 threat assessment cases reported involving “someone else,” 18 were described as follows: (4) partners/ex-partner/acquaintance of staff; (4) not known – two made on social media; (2) student threatened someone outside of the school environment; (1) football game attendee; (1) friend – no additional information; (1) someone from another school – no additional information; (1) community members near the school’s location; (1) someone from neighboring state; (1) sibling – no additional information; (1) substitute teacher; and (1) an adult non-relative known by a student.

Table 13 examines the numbers reported for each category of “subject of assessment” in 2018–2019 and the previous school year. For all categories except “students from your school,” the percent change may be somewhat volatile due to the relatively small numbers. The overall change for all categories combined shows an 11% increase in the number of threat assessments conducted from the 2017–2018 school year to the 2018–2019 school year.

Subject of assessment	Number of TAs conducted		Change from 2017–2018 to 2018–2019	
	2018–2019	2017–2018	Number	Percent
Student from your school	16,243	14,568	+1,675	+11%
Student not from your school	79	49	+30	+61%
Student formerly from your school	31	33	-2	-6%
Faculty/staff currently employed by your school	113	98	+15	+15%
Faculty/staff formerly employed by your school	11	5	+6	+120%
Parent/guardian of a student	71	92	-21	-23%
Someone else	25	24	+1	+4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>16,573</b>	<b>14,869</b>	<b>+1,704</b>	<b>+11%</b>

The increase in the overall number of threat assessments conducted in the 2018–2019 school year does not necessarily mean that schools are more dangerous. It more likely means that schools are becoming more comfortable and practiced at conducting threat assessments when they discover behaviors that are of concern. The threat assessment process helps schools connect the subjects of threat assessments (students, faculty, or others) with needed services, counseling, or awareness that their behavior is troubling.

**Subject of assessment and type of threat**

Schools were asked to identify the type(s) of threats made that prompted the threat assessments to be conducted. The types of threats are examined by the subject of the assessments (threats made by current students and threats made by others).

- There were 1,521 schools that conducted 16,243 threat assessments involving threats made by current students.
- There were 157 schools that conducted 330 threat assessments involving threats made by others (not current students).
- The majority of threats made by current students were against themselves (60%).
- The majority of threats made by others (not current students) were against others (80%).

Subject of assessment	Type of threat			Total
	Threatened self only	Threatened other(s) only	Threatened other(s) and self	
Current students	9,827 (60%)	5,631 (35%)	785 (5%)	16,243 (100%)
All others (not current students)	43 (13%)	265 (80%)	22 (7%)	330 (100%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,870 (60%)</b>	<b>5,896 (36%)</b>	<b>807 (5%)</b>	<b>16,573 (100%)</b>

*Data note: When schools are asked to report the types of threats and subjects of threat assessments, they are also asked to provide the sum of threat assessments by category. The sum is used for subsequent skip-logic questions. Any errors made by the schools in reporting these sums may affect whether they are asked follow-up (skip-logic) questions. The survey software used for collecting school and division survey data does not have the capability to sum the data reported by the schools, so we rely on the schools to do this.*

*In 2019, 1,538 schools reported conducting one or more threat assessments during the 2018–2019 school year. However, there were 393 schools that did not sum their data accurately and reported a sum of zero threat assessments, thus eliminating them from the population of schools that were asked follow-up questions based on a sum of “one or more.” This reporting error affects the remainder of the threat assessment section of this report. Notations are made in reporting the findings for the questions affected.*

**Threats made, not averted**

**Q. Of the threat assessment(s) conducted by your school in 2018–2019, in how many cases did the threat that was made, or a related act, ultimately occur?**

Schools that reported conducting one or more threat assessments in 2018–2019 were asked if any of the threatened acts or a related event actually occurred.


- 1,145 schools reported conducting a total of 13,495 threat assessments
- Of the 13,495 threat assessments conducted, 579 (4%) resulted in the threatened act, or a related act occurring (the threat was not averted)
  - 1,538 schools conducted 16,573 threat assessments (should have answered this question)
  - 1,145 schools conducted 13,495 threat assessments (did answer this question reporting 579 threats occurred)
  - 393 schools conducted 3,078 threat assessments (did not answer this question due to sum error)
  - If reported data were representative, estimate an additional 132 threats occurred at the 393 schools that did not report

**Time interval from report of threat to assessment conducted**

**Q. Of the threat assessment(s) conducted by your school in 2018–2019, how many were conducted within the following time intervals of the threat being received by the threat assessment team (TAT)?**

Most threat assessments (10,755; 81%) were conducted immediately after the school’s threat assessment team received report of the threat, 2,199 (17%) within 24 hours, and 320 (2%) after 24 hours or more.

**Chart 14: Time Interval between Threat Received by TAT and Assessment Conducted**



– N = 13,274 threat assessments conducted by 1,143 schools

**Use of clinical assessments**

Schools were asked whether any students who were subjects of threat assessment were ever recommended to have a clinical assessment conducted, or if such assessments were used as a prerequisite for a student’s return to school.

- 1,521 schools conducted 16,243 threat assessments where the subject was a current student (should have answered the following two questions)
- 1,126 schools conducted 13,186 threat assessments where the subject was a current student (did answer the following two questions)
- 395 schools conducted 3,057 threat assessments where the subject was a current student (did not answer the following two questions due to sum error)

**Clinical assessment recommended**

**Q. How many of the students that were subjects of reported threat assessment (TA) cases were recommended to have a clinical assessment conducted by a community-based or private licensed mental health professional (community services board, private provider, etc.)?**

The majority of responding schools (795 schools; 71%) recommended at least one student TA subject have a clinical assessment.

These 795 schools conducted 10,749 threat assessments where a current student was the subject of the assessment.

Of these 10,749 TA cases, about one-third (3,379; 31%) resulted in the student subject being recommended to have a clinical assessment conducted by a community-based or private licensed mental health professional.

**Clinical assessment required**

**Q. How many of the students were required to undergo clinical assessment conducted by a community-based or private licensed mental health professional (community services board, private provider, etc.) before being permitted to continue at the school?**

More than half of responding schools (613 schools; 54%) required at least one student TA subject have a clinical assessment before they were permitted to return to school.

These 613 schools conducted 8,732 threat assessments where a current student was the subject of the assessment.

Of these 8,732 TA cases, 1,990 (23%) required the student to undergo a clinical assessment conducted by a community-based or private licensed mental health professional before they were permitted to continue at the school.

**Highest-level threat (HLT) cases**

**Q. How many threat(s) were classified at the highest threat level (imminent/high risk, very serious substantive) at any point in the threat assessment process?**

**Q. Of the cases you reported classified at the highest threat level at some point in the threat assessment process, in how many cases did the threat or some other act of violence ultimately occur?**

Over one-third of responding schools (415 schools; 37%) had one or more threats classified as a HLT at some point in the assessment process.

These 415 schools conducted 7,252 threat assessments involving current students. Of these cases, 1,169 (16%) were classified at the highest threat level at some point in the threat assessment process.

Of the 1,169 HLT cases, most (1,131, 97%) were ultimately averted (the threat did not occur).

- Based on the data reported, it is estimated that approximately 271 HLTs were missing from the HLT total of 1,169, which would have resulted in 1,440 HLTs. Based on the fact that 3% of the 1,169 HLTs resulted in a completed act, it is estimated that there would have been approximately 47 completed HLT acts if all schools had reported.

*In summary, of the reported 13,186 threat assessment cases involving current students conducted in 2018–2019 (and for which we have complete data), 1,169 (9%) were classified as a highest-level threat (HLT) by 415 schools, and among those, 38 (3%) resulted in an act being carried out at 28 schools.*

*Overall, 0.3% (less than 1%) of threats made by current students resulted in a highest-level threat being carried out at 1.4% of the schools.*

**Case descriptions**

The 28 schools that reported the 38 HLT events that occurred were asked to describe those events by providing the following case description information:

- The type of act that was threatened
- The actual act that took place
- The steps taken, if any, to try to prevent the act
- Whether a student from their school was the primary initiator of the event, and if so,
  - Whether the student was able to continue attending their school at some time after the event
  - Whether there was more than one student considered primary in the event
  - After what period of time the student was able to continue attending their school
  - If the student was placed in an alternative school, and if so, for what period of time
- Any other information about the event

The following is a summary of the case information provided by the schools. Of the 38 case descriptions, 31% were provided by elementary schools, 33% by middle schools, 36% by high schools, and none by other schools.

**Types of threats made and acts they resulted in:**

**23 suicide/self-harm threats resulted in**

- 10 suicide attempts (3 of which were overdoses)
- 6 self-harm (by cutting)
- 1 self-harm and self-choking
- 2 self-choking
- 1 self-stabbed
- 1 self-stab attempt
- 2 assault

**9 assault threats resulted in**

- 6 assaults
- 1 arson
- 1 attempted stabbing
- 1 strangulation

**2 no prior threat made resulted in**

- 1 sexual assault
- 1 attempted arson

**1 weapon possession resulted in**

- 1 weapon fired

**1 general threat resulted in**

- 1 attempt to locate administrator

**1 homicide threat resulted in**

- 1 self-choking

**1 threat of mayhem resulted in**

- 1 intimidation, verbal assault

**Resulting acts and preventative steps/post-act steps taken:**

**Suicide attempts/threats, self-harm**

Mental health evaluation, safety contract, hospitalization, law enforcement intervention, crisis team called, parents called, CPS involvement, de-escalation, recommendation to CSB and outside services, Narcan injection for overdose, 911 called

**Assaults**

Law enforcement response, CPI restraint, safety plan, mental health evaluation, home bound instruction, counseling

**General threat**

Notified YSO, Pupil discipline office, numerous interventions

**Intimidation**

De-escalation

**Sexual assault**

Suspension and incident referred to Commonwealth’s Attorney

**Weapon fired**

lockdown

**A student was the primary initiator in all 38 events**

- Of these 38 students, 25 (66%) were able to continue attending their school at some time after the event; 12 were not, one was unknown.
- Two of the 25 students (8%) that eventually returned to the school were able to continue attending school immediately; the other 23 are described in Table 15.

Number of students	Student able to continue at their school after
0	1 day
1	3 days
5	5 day suspension
2	11–45 school days
2	More than 45 days
7	Hospitalization
4	Mental health evaluation
2	Seeing a doctor (psychiatrist, physician)

## 5. CONCERNS, TRAINING, AND RESOURCE NEEDS

### Safety-Related Training

Schools were asked to review a list of school safety training topics and select the type(s) most needed by their school’s administration/faculty/staff. More than two-thirds of all schools (70%) reported that training on recognition of mental health problems is needed. Just under two-thirds (63%) reported that de-escalation and mediation training is needed and well over half (59%) reported social/emotional intervention and support training is needed.

**Q. What type(s) of school safety training is most needed by your school’s administration/faculty/staff?**

Training type	Percent
Mental health problem awareness and recognition	70%
De-escalation and mediation	63%
Social/emotional interventions and supports	59%
Trauma-informed classrooms	47%
Alternatives to suspension and expulsion	46%
Trauma-informed care	41%
School-wide positive behavior supports	30%
Peer relations	28%
Social media (Facebook, Snapchat, Twitter, YouTube, etc.)	28%
Crisis planning, prevention and response	27%
Threat assessment team training	23%
Suicide prevention and intervention	18%
Violence prevention training	15%
Safety and security site assessments	12%
Gang awareness	10%
Security technology and hardware	10%
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)	3%
Other	1%
None of the above	2%

(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)


Specific training described as “other” included: training focused on behavioral challenges, mental health, and substance use of students (9 schools); school climate issues such as restorative practices and equity (4); security-related training such as crisis planning and threat assessment in a PreK school and unarmed security (3); training for rapport with parents such as seeking support or de-escalation in a conflict (2), staff training in self-care or for front office personnel (2); and generally seeking more training (2).

**Monitoring social media**

**Q. Is someone at the school administration level specifically responsible (such as, it is in their job description) for monitoring social media (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, etc.) to detect and mitigate potential threats and other safety issues?**

Most schools (72%) do not have a designated person specifically responsible for monitoring social media for threats and other safety issues; one-fifth of schools (20%) do.

**Chart 15: Have Designated Personnel to Monitor Social Media**



**Physical safety and well-being**

This year, this question asked about students and staff separately to see if the perceived issues were different for each of these groups. The top three issues of physical safety and well-being were the same for both groups: Lack of designated security personnel, lack of fencing or other peripheral security, and multiple building/portable classrooms.

**Q. What was the prime issue affecting your school as it pertained to the physical safety and well-being of students?**

When asked about the prime issue that affected the physical safety and well-being of students, schools most frequently cited lack of security personnel (23%) and lack of fencing/peripheral security (16%).

**Table 17: Primary Issue of Student Physical Safety and Well-Being**

Issue	Number of schools	Percentage of schools
Lack of designated security personnel	445	23%
Lack of fencing or other peripheral security	319	16%
Multiple building/portable classrooms	258	13%
Unsupervised areas during the school day	208	11%
Inability to secure classrooms	116	6%
Unsupervised after school activities	74	4%
Physical dangers from unfunded repairs	65	3%
Lack of supervision in one or more classrooms	36	2%
None or N/A	124	6%
Other	316	16%

(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

Responses to other included: more support to address the mental health needs of students (46 schools); need for /improvements in security cameras (41); behavioral issues of students (37); need for better controls in access to school building, require visitors to check in at office (35); social media issues (20); unstructured time such as recess, lunch, hallway (18); need for additional security support such as SROs, SSOs (13); need for additional staff, especially for students with high need, behavioral issues (10); inability to secure exterior doors, doors propped open by staff/students (10); improvements in/need for radio/intercoms (9); safety in parking and drop-off areas (8); issues in surrounding community (8); building issues such as construction, design,

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multiple entrances (8); training for staff, especially in student behavioral issues, de-escalation (7); location of school building such as on a busy road, or very rural (7); visitor security (5); after hours event security (5); unmonitored bathrooms (4); playground repairs, need for additional exits in fenced areas (4); overcrowding (4); cafeteria supervision (9); safety on buses (4); building is dual use, other entities/community have access (4); peer relations/climate (3); vaping (2).

**Q. What was the prime issue affecting your school as it pertained to the physical safety and well-being of staff?**

When asked about the prime issue that affected the physical safety/well-being of staff, schools again most frequently cited lack of security personnel (23%) and lack of fencing/peripheral security (15%).

Table 18: Primary Issue of Staff Physical Safety and Well-Being		
Issue	Number of schools	Percentage of schools
Lack of designated security personnel	460	23%
Lack of fencing or other peripheral security	285	15%
Multiple building/portable classrooms	248	13%
Inability to secure classrooms	152	8%
Unsupervised areas during the school day	136	7%
Physical dangers from unfunded repairs	67	3%
Unsupervised after school activities	55	3%
Lack of supervision in one or more classrooms	28	1%
None or N/A	204	10%
Other	306	16%

(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

Responses to other included: behavioral issues of students (49 schools); more support to address the mental health needs of students (43); need for better controls in access to school building, require visitors to check in at office (28); need for/improvements in security cameras (24); additional training needed generally and in trauma, behavioral challenges, classroom management, drills, de-escalation (24); building issues such as windows, construction/renovation, aging buildings (20); improvements in communication/need for radio/intercoms (18); staffing shortages generally, and in support of student mental health/behavioral issues (14); inability to secure exterior doors, doors propped open by staff/students (12); unstructured time such as recess, lunch, hallway (9); improvements needed on school grounds such as fence repair, sidewalks, parking areas (8); location of building, such as in a high-traffic area (8); accidents, slip/falls, student inflicted (7); stress and self-care (6); building is dual use, other entities/community have access (5); after hours event security (5); updating locks, master keys (5); social media (4); issues in surrounding community (3); visitor security (3); issues with parents (3); workload (3); need more counselors (2); need more substitute teachers (2); vaping (1).

**Mental/emotional safety and well-being**

This question also asked about students and staff separately to see if the perceived issues were different for each of these groups. Again, the top three issues of mental/emotional safety and well-being were the same for both groups: Unmet mental health needs/limited mental health resources, Lack of counseling personnel for students, and counseling personnel tasked with non-mental health-related assignments.

**Q. What was the prime issue that affected your school as it pertained to the mental and emotional safety and well-being of students?**

When asked about the prime issue affecting the mental/emotional safety and well-being of students, schools most frequently cited unmet mental health needs/limited mental health resources (53%).

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<b>Table 19: Primary Issue of Student Mental/Emotional Safety and Well-Being</b>		
<b>Issue</b>	<b>Number of schools</b>	<b>Percentage of schools</b>
Unmet mental health needs/limited mental health resources	1043	53%
Lack of counseling personnel for students	239	12%
Counseling personnel tasked with non-MH-related assignments	172	9%
Bullying	160	8%
Lack of connection with other students	64	3%
Lack of connection with teachers/staff	44	2%
Retaining qualified teachers	44	2%
Lack of available climate improvement training	27	1%
None or N/A	54	3%
Other	114	6%

(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

Responses to other included: family-related issues at home, parental pressure, resource needs, poverty, parental cooperation/involvement/support (22 schools); mental health needs for students, training for staff, limits of school mental health support (12); social media-related issues (18); school climate involving interpersonal issues/social skills among students (9); counseling-related needs such as psychologists/social workers/clinic aide, counselor caseloads, ineffective counselors (9); need for trauma informed classroom training (9); student stress levels, depression, anxiety (7); student social-emotional skills, coping strategies, and social-emotional staff training (5); cyberbullying (3); student behavioral issues (3); other (17).

**Q. What was the prime issue that affected your school as it pertained to the mental and emotional safety and well-being of staff?**

When asked about the prime issue affecting the mental/emotional safety and well-being of staff, schools again most frequently cited unmet mental health needs/limited mental health resources (35%).

<b>Table 20: Primary Issue of Staff Mental/Emotional Safety and Well-Being</b>		
<b>Issue</b>	<b>Number of schools</b>	<b>Percentage of schools</b>
Unmet mental health needs/limited mental health resources	695	35%
Lack of counseling personnel for students	210	11%
Counseling personnel tasked with non-MH-related assignments	165	8%
Retaining qualified teachers	127	6%
Lack of available climate improvement training	125	6%
Lack of connection with teachers/staff	120	6%
Lack of connection with other students	100	5%
Bullying	14	1%
None or N/A	175	9%
Other	248	13%

(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

Responses to other included: stress-related concerns such as stress of the job, work/life balance, stress management, secondary trauma, self-care (59 schools); work issues like work load, overwhelmed, demands of students with high-needs, not enough time for planning (36); lack of mental health supports generally, mental health needs of staff not addressed, student mental health challenges (26); trauma-related concerns such as the effects of trauma on school environment/students/staff, need for trauma-informed training, secondary trauma (26); training needed to address protocols, classroom management, behavioral challenges/de-escalation, climate improvement, mental health issues, self-care, social-emotional learning (18); lack of parental support/involvement, parent expectations, bullying by parents, family challenges affecting student behavior/mental health (12); student behavioral problems create stress for staff, is overwhelming (10); schools understaffed, lack of qualified faculty, substitute availability (11); climate concerns among students, between

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staff, and with administration (8); lack of counseling services for staff, need for full-time psychologist/social worker (5); unfunded mandates, not enough funding for school system, limited funds to support students with significant emotional needs (4); schools are over-crowded (3); low salaries (3); social media (2); don't know (14); other (7)

**Best Practices Summary**

A number of questions previously discussed in this report ask about safety practices that are considered best practice. This table summarizes the schools' responses to these questions, in order from most to least schools reported using the practice.

<b>Table 21: Best Practices Summary – Schools</b>				
<b>Best Practice</b>	<b>Percent of Schools</b>			<b>Details on page</b>
	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Don't know</b>	
Exterior entrances locked	96%	4%	-	16
Main entrance secured with controlled access	95%	5%	-	16
Designated reunification site	92%	8%	-	16
Checklist to assist with threatening communication	89%	11%	-	16
First responders have access during a lockdown	81%	8%	11%	15
Inform faculty/staff of drills in advance	79%	21%	-	14
School administrators can communicate with first responders via radio during emergency	75%	15%	9%	15
Electronic floor plans accessible to first responders	66%	12%	22%	14
Classrooms can be locked from both inside and outside	60%	40%	-	16
Someone stationed at front entrance	60%	40%	-	16
Inform students of drills in advance	55%	45%	-	14/15
Web-based anonymous text or tip line	41%	59%	-	21
Inform parents of drills in advance	26%	74%	-	14
Designated person to monitor social media	20%	72%	8%	29

# V. FINDINGS FROM THE 2018–2019 VIRGINIA SCHOOL DIVISION SURVEY

Division superintendents from Virginia’s 132 school divisions were asked to respond to school safety-related questions about policies and conditions in their division during the 2018–2019 school year. Responses were received from all divisions resulting in a 100% compliance rate. (N = 132 unless otherwise noted.) Responses were provided by the division’s current/acting superintendent in 23% of the division surveys, other responses were provided by Assistant Superintendents, Director of Administrative Services, Director of Operations, Director of Safety/Security, Director of Student Services, among others.

## Division Enrollment

Division student enrollment was examined and used to describe some of the analyses of the division safety survey data. ([www.doe.virginia.gov/statistics\\_reports/enrollment/index.shtml](http://www.doe.virginia.gov/statistics_reports/enrollment/index.shtml), VDOE Fall Membership Reports)

Range	Number of divisions	Percent of divisions
1 – 1000	13	10%
1001 – 2000	24	18%
2001 – 3000	19	14%
3001 – 4000	12	9%
4001 – 5000	16	12%
5001 – 10,000	21	16%
10,001 – 15,000	11	8%
15,001 – 30,000	8	6%
30,001 – 100,000	7	5%
100,000 +	1	1%
Total	132	100%

## 1. SAFETY-RELATED PERSONNEL AND PARTNERSHIPS

Divisions were asked about a number of various safety-related personnel employed by or working in their division and about the types of agreements and partnerships they have with local entities.

### Mental health professionals

**Q. Among the schools in your school division during 2018–2019, what was the number of full-time and of part-time school-based mental health personnel (counselor, psychologist, social worker, substance abuse counselor) who allocated at least 50% of their employed time providing mental health services, and**

- **were hired by the school division to serve specific schools or a combination of schools,**
- **work in the schools through a day treatment program, and/or**
- **work in the schools through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with a community agency?**

Divisions reported a total of 6,639.7 school-based mental health professionals (MHP) working full-time and part-time in the schools in 2018–2019, a 22% increase over last year. Of these, 69% were hired by the division, 22% were from day treatment programs, and 9% were from community agencies with whom the division contracted.

- Total full-time MHPs (all 3 types): 6352.5
- Total part-time MHPs (all 3 types): 287.2

The statewide average number of school-based mental health professionals hired by the divisions (full-time and part-time) was 34.7 per division. This figure was likely affected by the considerable numbers reported from

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some of Virginia’s larger school divisions. For comparison, the median number of full-time hired MH professionals was six.

The divisions with the greatest number of full-time hired MH professionals reported 1072, 376, 323, 287, and 278.

<b>Table 23: School-Based Mental Health Professionals</b>			
	<b>Number hired by divisions</b>	<b>Number day treatment programs</b>	<b>Number MOU with community agencies</b>
<b>Number of MH professionals</b>			
Full-time	4440.5	1386	526
Part-time	142.2	79	66
<b>Median number</b>			
Full-time	6	4.5	0
Part-time	0	0	0
<b>Average number</b>			
Full-time	33.6	10.5	4.0
Part-time	1.1	0.6	0.5
<b>Number of divisions that reported having no MH personnel</b>			
Full-time	22	46	73
Part-time	100	113	109
<b>Range in reported number of MH professionals</b>			
Full-time	1072 – 0	135 – 0	60 – 0
Part-time	36 – 0	24 – 0	15 – 0

Two divisions reported they had no full-time or part-time mental health professionals, and two others reported having no full-time mental health professionals.

**Director of School Safety**

**Q. Was there a Director of School Safety or Director of School Security (or person of similar title whose responsibility is the oversight of school safety-related activities) employed within the school division?**

- Eighty divisions (61%) employ a Director of School Safety or Director of School Security (or person of similar title whose responsibility is the oversight of school safety-related activities).

This is a 7% decrease in what was reported for 2017–2018. Generally, the higher the enrollment of the division, the more likely that division will employ a Director of School Safety/Security.

**Emergency Manager**


[§ 22.1-279.8\(D\)](#) requires that each school division designate an emergency manager.

**Q. Was your division’s Emergency Manager hired to serve specifically in this role, or did they assume this responsibility in addition to another role?**

- In most divisions (85%), the role of Emergency Manager was undertaken in addition to someone’s other roles/responsibilities.
- In 10% of divisions, the responsibilities of an Emergency Manager were split among multiple individuals.

- In 5% of divisions, the Emergency Managers were hired to serve this role specifically and the position was their only responsibility. This is down from 8% reported in 2017–2018.

**Chart 16: Division Emergency Managers’ Roles**



No divisions with an enrollment of less than 5,000 had an Emergency Manager where Emergency Manager was their only responsibility.

**Division/law enforcement memorandum of understanding**

**Q. Did your division have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in place to facilitate the partnership between schools and law enforcement?**

- Most divisions (119, 90%) have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in place to facilitate the partnership between schools and law enforcement.

The 119 divisions that reported having a MOU, were asked a follow-up question:

**Q. Did you disseminate this information to the administrators/staff of all of your division’s schools?**

A majority of the divisions (71%) provided information to all their division schools about their MOU between division schools and law enforcement. Of these, 66 divisions provided training to the school personnel on the roles and responsibilities of SROs in the schools.


<b>Table 24: Schools/Law Enforcement MOU Information Disseminated to All Division Schools (N = 119)</b>		
	<b>Number of divisions</b>	<b>Percentage of divisions</b>
Yes	85	71%
No	25	21%
Other	9	8%

Other responses said information was provided as needed/to schools with SROs only (3), discussed at trainings/in-service with admin (2), available for public view at school board office (1), discussed with principal (1), and other (2).

**Security personnel**

**Q. What type(s) of security personnel worked in your division during the 2018–2019 school year?**

**Chart 17: Security Personnel Working in Divisions**



(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

Nearly all divisions (127 divisions, 96%) reported having SROs working at some of their divisions’ schools, while 29% (38 divisions) reported having SSOs working at some of their schools. Two divisions reported having private security officers, and four divisions reported having none of these.

**School resource officers (SROs)**

**SRO grant funding**

Follow up questions were asked of the 127 divisions that reported having SROs.

**Q. How were school resource officers (SROs) funded in your division?**

Divisions with SROs were asked how these positions were funded. Just under half (45%) reported that SROs were funded solely through the local law enforcement agency (LEA). One quarter (25%) were funded by a combination of division and LEA funds.

<b>Table 25: How SRO Positions were Funded (N = 127)</b>		
	<b>Number of divisions</b>	<b>Percentage of divisions</b>
Solely by a law enforcement agency (LEA)	57	45%
From a combination of division and LEA funds	32	25%
Through grant funds from DCJS (SRO Grant Fund and Program)	13	10%
Solely by the school division	9	7%
Don’t know	6	5%
Other	10	8%

Other funding combinations were: DCJS, division, and LEA funds (3), DCJS and local funds (2), DCJS and LEA funds (1), division and grant funds (1), LEA and grant funds (1), local and grant funds (1), and local and state funds (1).

**Q. Did your division apply for SRO grant funds last year? (N = 132)**

- Thirty divisions (23%) reported applying for SRO grant funds last year,
- Ninety-one divisions (69%) did not, and
- Eleven divisions (8%) did not know.

**Q. Why did your division not apply for SRO funds last year?**

Of the 91 divisions that *did not* apply for SRO funds last year, the majority (62%) said that their SRO positions were not eligible.

<b>Table 16: Obstacles to Applying for SRO Grant Funds (N = 91)</b>		
	<b>Number of divisions</b>	<b>Percentage of divisions</b>
All SRO positions were supported by local funding and were not eligible	61	67%
Not aware of grant opportunity	7	8%
Not interested in funding SRO positions	3	3%
Applied for and denied funding	0	0%
Other	20	22%

Other includes: Another local entity applied (9) – 8 were local LEA, 1 was county; temporary nature of the grant funding (3); ineligible (2) – 1 all secondary schools have SROs, 1 funding not available for part-time SRO; informed too late to apply (1); LEA is understaffed (1); match could not be met (1); timing didn’t work with budget process (1); SSO grant awarded (1), and don’t know (1).

**School security officers (SSOs)**

Follow up questions were asked of the 38 divisions that reported having SSOs. Generally, the divisions with larger enrollments are more likely to employ SSOs.

**SSO supervision**

**Q. Were the school security officers (SSOs) working in your school division supervised at the school or division level?** (N = 38)

In most divisions with SSOs (28 divisions, 74%), the SSOs are supervised at the school level.

**Armed SSO policy**

[§ 22.1-280.2:1](#) describes the purposes for which a local school board may employ a school security officer and the requirements if they are to carry a firearm.

**Q. What is your division’s current policy on allowing SSOs to be armed?**

- The majority of divisions with SSOs reported that armed SSOs were not permitted and they are not considering changing this policy in the near future (84%). Five divisions (13%) allowed armed SSOs. No divisions with enrollment below 3,000 allowed SSOs to be armed in 2018–2019.

<b>Table 27: Current Division Policy on Allowing SSOs to be Armed (N = 38)</b>		
<b>Policy position</b>	<b>Number of divisions</b>	<b>Percentage of divisions</b>
SSOs were not allowed to be armed in division schools, and we are not considering changing this policy in the near future	32	84%
SSOs allowed to be armed in division schools	5	13%
We didn’t allow SSOs to be armed, but are considering allowing it	1	3%

**Notification of certain offenses to and from law enforcement**


[§ 22.1-279.3:1\(B\)](#) details the types of offenses that law enforcement are required to report to school/division authorities when committed by students, and [§ 22.1-279.3:1\(D\)](#) details the types of offenses that school/division authorities are required to report to law enforcement when committed by students.

**Q. Were there formal written processes or protocols in place for your school division to receive notification on the Code listed offenses from local law enforcement?**

- A majority of divisions (102, 77%) have formal written processes/protocols to receive notification on listed Code offenses from local law enforcement.

**Q. Were there formal written processes or protocols in place for your division to provide notification to law enforcement on the Code listed offenses when committed by students?**

- Most divisions (115, 87%) have formal written processes/protocols to notify local law enforcement on listed Code offenses committed by students.



**2. EMERGENCY PLANNING, DRILLS, AND RESPONSE**

**Lockdown drills**

[§ 22.1-137.2](#) describes the requirement for conducting lockdown drills: *In every public school there shall be a lock-down drill at least twice during the first 20 school days of each school session, in order that students may be thoroughly practiced in such drills. Every public school shall hold at least two additional lock-down drills during the remainder of the school session. Lock-down plans and drills shall be in compliance with the Statewide Fire Prevention Code ([§ 27-94 et seq.](#)).*

**Q. Besides the four (4) required lockdown drills, did you have a division-wide requirement that schools conduct additional lockdown drills?**

- Fourteen divisions (11%) require their schools to conduct additional lockdown drills besides the four lockdown drills required in Code. This is how the divisions described the additional requirements:  
 Additional drills throughout the school year (5); drills are required monthly (4); active shooter protocols (3); remain in place/remain indoors (1); tech and procedure (1).

**Q. Besides the four (4) required lockdown drills, did your division conduct any additional exercises with law enforcement or other first responders in the past year?**

- Seventy-seven divisions (58%) reported conducting additional exercises with law enforcement or other first responders in the past year. Of these, the additional exercises were described as:

<b>Table 28: Descriptions of Additional Exercises with First Responders (N = 77)</b>		
<b>Description of additional exercises</b>	<b>Number of divisions</b>	<b>Percentage of divisions</b>
Full-scale drill	37	48%
Table top simulation	31	40%
Active shooter/threat training	12	16%
First responder involvement (1 observation/feedback, 1 evacuation drill, 1 when buildings are empty)	4	5%
K9 search/drug dog	4	5%
Law enforcement involvement (1 observation/analysis, 1 coordinated with, 1 lockdown with)	4	5%
SWAT involvement (1 with transportation department, 1 when buildings are empty)	2	3%
Intruder drill (avoid/deny/defend)	2	3%
Other	7	9%

(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

Other included: faculty training (1); lecture (1); training with safety professional (1); secure the building drill (1); unannounced drill with SRO for middle and high schools (1); walk through drill (1); and in conjunction with YSU training (1).

**Drill Notification**

**Q. Did you have a division-wide policy that required schools to inform students, parents, and/or faculty and staff in advance about an upcoming drill or exercise (lockdown, fire, shelter-in-place, etc.)?**

Most divisions (108, 82%) do not have a policy to provide advance notice to any of the listed groups, while 23 (17%) divisions have a policy that addressed at least one of these groups. There were eight divisions that reported having a policy to provide advance notice about drills/exercises to all three listed groups.

<b>Table 29: Had Policy to Inform in Advance (N = 23)</b>		
<b>Group</b>	<b>Number of divisions</b>	<b>Percentage of divisions</b>
Students	12	52%
Parents	10	43%
Faculty/staff	22	96%

(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

Of the 23 divisions with a policy, nearly all (96%) address advance notice of faculty/staff, about half (52%) address students, and fewer than half (43%) address advance notice of parents.

Among the 12 divisions with a policy informing students in advance,

- 24 hours or more 6 divisions
- Informed immediately prior to 5 divisions
- Other 1 division

Among the 10 divisions with a policy informing parents in advance,

- 24 hours or more 6 divisions
- Informed immediately prior to 3 divisions
- Other 1 division

Among the 22 divisions with a policy informing faculty/staff in advance,

- 24 hours or more 12 divisions
- Informed immediately prior to 7 divisions
- Other 3 divisions


**Safety audit recommendations**

Per Virginia Code [§ 22.1-279.8](#), all schools in Virginia are required to complete an annual School Safety Audit and all Superintendents are required to establish a safety audit committee to review the completed safety audits from schools in the division. The Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety requires all Superintendents, or their designee, to certify the completion of several components of the safety audit via the survey manager.

**Q. Based on the review completed by your division’s safety audit committee, did your school division submit any recommendations to your local school board for improvement regarding physical safety concerns of division schools in the 2018–2019 school year? If so, please list the top five recommendations made to the school board by the safety audit committee regarding physical safety concerns.**

Seventy-eight divisions (59%) reported submitting recommendations for physical safety improvements to their School Board in 2018–2019. The top ten recommendations were:

**Chart 19: Top Ten Safety Audit Committee Recommendations**



The full list of recommendations for physical safety improvements can be found in Appendix A of this report.

### 3. THREAT REPORTING AND ASSESSMENTS

[§ 23.1-805](#) describes violence prevention committees and threat assessment teams, and requires committees to “provide guidance to students, faculty, and staff regarding recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a physical threat to the community.”

#### Oversight

[§ 22.1-79.4](#) describes the roles of threat assessment teams and oversight committees in school divisions.

*B. The superintendent of each school division may establish a committee charged with oversight of the threat assessment teams operating within the division, which may be an existing committee established by the division. The committee shall include individuals with expertise in human resources, education, school administration, mental health, and law enforcement.*

**Q. Was there a division oversight team for threat assessment? If so, which professionals were represented by the members of your oversight team?**

- Ninety divisions (68%) reported having oversight committees for their schools’ threat assessment teams. Most of these committees included principals/assistant principals (83%), three-quarters included law enforcement (77%), and two-thirds included school psychologists/other licensed clinicians (67%).

Table 30: Professions Represented on Division Oversight Teams (N = 90)		
Type of Professional	Number of divisions	Percentage of divisions
School principal/assistant principal	75	83%
Law enforcement (SRO or local/state law enforcement)	69	77%
School psychologist/other clinically licensed professional	60	67%
Guidance counselor	58	64%
Superintendent/assistant superintendent	52	58%
Faculty representative	44	49%
School health professional/school nurse	36	40%
Case manager	31	34%
Human resources	26	29%
Legal counsel	8	9%
Public relations/media coordinator	7	8%
None of the above	3	3%

(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

#### Reporting threats

**Q. Did your division have a division-wide, web-based, anonymous text or tip line (for use with computer or smart phone) for reporting threats/aberrant behavior?**

Just over half of divisions (69 divisions, 52%) report having a division-wide, web-based anonymous text/tip line.

**Q. In 2018–2019, did your division have operable, division-wide...  
 electronic/computer-based threat assessment case management tool to assist in the records management of threats?  
 school safety mobile application (app) for students and others to report and receive information about threats or crimes via text, audio, or video/images in real-time (24/7)?  
 school safety mobile application (app) for real-time (24/7) crisis intervention services by licensed clinicians (via calls, texts, online chat portals)?**

Table 31: Threat Report Methods and Management		
Report method	Number of divisions	Percentage of divisions
Threat assessment case management tool	27	20%
Threat reporting app	27	20%
Crisis intervention app	7	5%

*Of the 27 divisions that reported having an electronic/computer-based threat assessment case management:*

- Eighteen divisions (67%): created their own system
- Eight divisions (30%): contracted with an outside vendor
- One division (4%): other

*Of the 27 divisions that reported having an app for students and others to report and receive information about threats or crimes in real-time (24/7):*

- Twenty divisions (74%): contracted with an outside vendor
- Four divisions (15%): created their own system
- Two divisions (7%): use Anonymous Alerts mobile application
- One division (4%): reported using Police Department Crime Solvers

*Of the seven divisions that reported having an app for real-time (24/7) crisis intervention services by licensed clinicians:*

- Five divisions: contracted with an outside vendor
- Two divisions: created their own system

**Law enforcement notification of threats**

**Q. Did your division have a written policy or procedure for notifying local law enforcement or other institutions when a threat is made by students or non-students at your school? If not, what were the obstacles to sharing information with law enforcement or other institutions?**

- Most divisions (113, 86%) had a written process/policy for notifying local law enforcement or other institutions when a threat is made by students or non-students.
- Fourteen divisions (11%) said there were no obstacles, and communication occurs regularly, however a written policy is not currently in place.
- Five divisions (4%) said that concerns about privacy laws were an obstacle, and one division noted that availability of law enforcement personnel was an obstacle.

**Threat assessment case records**

**Q. Where were threat assessment records (such as ‘Student Threat Assessment and Response Reports’) stored during 2018–2019?**

- Most divisions (110, 83%) reported storing threat assessment records with school administrators’ files, while just under half (58, 44%) reported these records were stored at the Central (division) office. Few divisions (7, 5%) reported storing records with law enforcement unit records.


**Training**

**Training on recognizing threats/aberrant behavior**

**Q. What mechanisms were in place to provide education related to threatening or aberrant behavior for school faculty/staff?**

A majority of divisions (70%) reported that training and education related to aberrant behavior for faculty/staff was provided by the schools, and 56% said this type of training was provided as a division-wide school safety in-service training.

**Chart 20: Training on Threats for Faculty/Staff**



(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

Other includes: DCJS training at schools (2); provided by Student Support and Disciplinary Review Office (1); at division-wide counselors meeting (1); at schools by request (1); offered to school teams, LEA offered at central office, and required for new personnel serving on a TAT (1); by SRO at schools with Division Safety Committee (1); school staff safety meeting agenda item (1); division review and improvement plan (1); LE trainings (1); other (2).

**Training on the threat assessment process**

**Q. What kind of training or technical assistance would help improve your division’s threat assessment (TA) process?**

A majority of the divisions (63%) felt that training for new staff would help improve their division’s threat assessment process, closely followed by training on classifying level of threats and when to conduct a TA (62%).

**Table 32: Training to Improve Threat Assessment Process**

Type of training	Number of divisions	Percentage of divisions
Training for new staff	83	63%
Level of threat training, when to conduct a TA (how to respond to various threat levels; when does a low-level threat require a TA)	82	62%
Case studies, scenario trainings (social media, harm to self/ others)	78	59%
Recognition of threats, threat types, and behavioral red flags	71	54%
Additional training by DCJS	71	54%
Online training in threat assessment	66	50%
Suicide prevention, ideation, threat assessment for suicide threat	64	48%
Refresher training and review	63	48%
Regional training with other divisions	50	38%
Specific threat assessment-related topics	23	17%
Other	6	5%
None of the above	3	2%

(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

Other includes: Access to a mobile app (1); bullying prevention (1); case management and record keeping (1); face-to-face training with online follow-up (1); funds to train (1); recognizing and understanding trauma responses in individuals (1).

**Threat assessment challenges**

**Q. What are the biggest challenges to setting up teams or conducting threat assessments?**

The biggest challenges in setting up TA teams or conducting threat assessments were coordinating schedules (40%), determining the level of threat (39%), limited staff (39%), and training for new staff/team members (39%).

<b>Table 33: Challenges to Setting Up Threat Assessment Teams and Conducting TAs</b>		
	<b>Number of divisions</b>	<b>Percentage of divisions</b>
Team coordination (managing team member schedules, availability to meet in timely manner)	53	40%
Determining level of threat (when does an act become a threat, how to determine threat level, what constitutes a threat)	52	39%
Limited staff and staff turnover/retention	52	39%
Training for new staff and for team members	52	39%
Consistency in division-wide practices	49	37%
Loss of instruction time, competing priorities, conducting thorough TA/review/debrief in a timely manner	41	31%
Understanding the function of threat assessments vs. discipline	38	29%
Threat assessment training resources	31	23%
Conducting reviews and updates	27	20%
Length of the form	24	18%
Privacy issues (FERPA, outside team members maintaining student confidentiality requirements)	16	12%
Other	8	6%
None	9	7%

(Survey instructed respondent to “select all that apply” so percentage total will not equal 100%.)

Other included: threat assessment form does not fit for outside persons or suicide-related threats (1); levels of threat (when does an act become a threat, how to determine a threat’s appropriate level, what constitutes a threat) (1); limited staff and staff turnover/retention (1); team coordination (managing team member schedules, availability to meet in a timely manner) (1); training for new staff and for team members (1); ensuring appropriate case management for students of concern (1); determining whether concern involves mental health rather than discipline (1); complications in the threat assessment process with students with disabilities (1).

**4. CONCERNS, TRAINING, AND RESOURCE NEEDS**

**Q. What is the prime issue currently affecting the school division as it pertains to the physical safety and well-being of students?**

Divisions most frequently cited multiple buildings/portable classrooms as the primary issue of student physical safety and well-being (21%), followed by lack of security personnel (16%).

**Table 34: Primary Issue of Student Physical Safety and Well-Being**

Issue	Number of divisions	Percentage of divisions
Multiple building/portable classrooms	28	21%
Lack of designated security personnel	21	16%
Lack of fencing or other peripheral security	17	13%
Unsupervised areas during the school day	15	11%
Unsupervised after school activities	15	11%
Inability to secure classrooms	8	6%
Physical dangers from unfunded repairs	4	3%
Lack of supervision in one or more classrooms	3	2%
Other	23	17%

Other includes: entrances: design of front entrance, secure (3); events: after school activities, field trips, safety during school events with many visitors and/or access points such as games, open house, back-to-school nights (3); addressing MH needs (3); student behavior (2); age and design of school buildings (2); additional personnel needed (2); transportation: logistics, limited resources (2); additional security cameras (1); conflicting guidance fire code (evacuating) and law enforcement (barricading) (1); improved drills such as division-wide training with classroom and practicals with first responders (1); funding security infrastructure projects, lack of security presence for elementary schools (1); antiquated exterior locks, issues with opening/propping doors (1); none (1).

**Q. What is the prime issue currently affecting the school division as it pertains to the physical safety and well-being of staff?**

The primary issue of staff physical safety and well-being were the same as for students: divisions most frequently cited multiple buildings/portable classrooms as (21%), followed by lack of security personnel (14%).

**Table 35: Primary Issue of Staff Physical Safety and Well-Being**

Issue	Number of divisions	Percentage of divisions
Multiple building/portable classrooms	28	21%
Lack of designated security personnel	19	14%
Lack of fencing or other peripheral security	19	14%
Unsupervised after school activities	15	11%
Unsupervised areas during the school day	13	10%
Inability to secure classrooms	11	8%
Physical dangers from unfunded repairs	6	5%
Lack of supervision in one or more classrooms	1	1%
Other	20	15%

Other includes: addressing mental health needs of students (3); student behavior (2); entrances: design of front entrance, secure (2); events: after school activities, field trips, safety during school events with many visitors and/or access points such as games, open house, back-to-school nights (2); older school buildings (1); additional security cameras (1); compassion fatigue (1); conflicting guidance fire code (evacuating) and law enforcement (barricading) (1); lack of security presence for elementary schools (1); antiquated exterior locks, issues with opening/propping doors (1); funding for security infrastructure projects (1); lack of personnel (1); training (1); unsupervised students in building after hours (1); none (1)

**Q. What is the prime issue currently affecting the school division as it pertains to the mental and emotional safety and well-being of students?**

More than half of the divisions (55%) cited unmet mental health needs/limited mental health resources as the primary issue affecting student mental/emotional safety and well-being.

Table 36: Primary Issue of Student Mental/Emotional Safety and Well-Being		
Issue	Number of divisions	Percentage of divisions
Unmet mental health needs/limited mental health resources in the community	72	55%
Lack of in-house counseling/mental health personnel available to assist students	41	31%
Retaining qualified teachers	7	5%
Lack of available climate improvement training	2	2%
Lack of connection with teachers/staff	3	2%
Lack of connection with other students	3	2%
Other	4	3%

Other includes: having students come forward (1); dysfunctional families and increased drug issues (1); lack of engagement from some parents (1); time for counselors to help students in need (1).

**Q. What is the prime issue currently affecting the school division as it pertains to the mental and emotional safety and well-being of staff?**

Table 37: Primary Issue of Staff Mental/Emotional Safety and Well-Being		
Issue	Number of divisions	Percentage of divisions
Unmet mental health needs/limited mental health resources in the community	58	44%
Lack of in-house counseling/mental health personnel available to assist students	34	26%
Retaining qualified teachers	14	11%
Lack of available climate improvement training	6	5%
Lack of connection with teachers/staff	5	4%
Lack of connection with other students	2	2%
None or N/A	3	2%
Other	10	8%


Other includes: increased demands (3); don't know (2); lack of parental engagement and support (2); job stress, challenges (2); communication with staff (1); dysfunctional families and increased drug use (1); compassion fatigue (1); working with disruptive students who face trauma in their lives (1); staff turnover (1); none (1).

**Social Media Monitoring**

**Q. How did your division monitor social media (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, etc.) to detect and mitigate potential threats and other safety issues?**

Most divisions (67%) reported that they do not have a specific social media monitoring process, one-fifth (20%) have someone at the division level who is responsible for monitoring social media, and 9% contracted with a cyber security company to monitor social media (e.g., Gaggle, GeoListening, etc.).

**Chart 21: How Divisions Monitor Social Media**



Other includes: informal monitoring: staff, students, community, SRO, LEA partners provide information about concerning social media posts (4); law enforcement/SRO monitors social media and shares as necessary (3); partnership with local LEA (1); other (2).

**Best Practices Summary**

A number of questions in the division safety survey asked about safety practices that are considered best practice. This table summarizes the divisions’ responses to these questions, in order from most to least divisions reported using the practice.

Table 38: Best Practices Summary – Divisions			
Best Practice	Percent of Divisions		Details on page
	Yes	No	
MOU between schools and law enforcement	90%	10%	35
Formal procedures to provide notification on Code offenses from LE	87%	13%	38
Written policy to notify local LE when threat is made	86%	14%	42
Formal procedures to receive notification on Code offenses from LE	77%	23%	38
Division threat assessment oversight team	68%	32%	41
Director of School Safety/Security	61%	39%	34
Division-wide, web-based anonymous text or tip line	52%	48%	41
Monitor social media	32%	67%	46
Policy to inform faculty/staff in advance of drills	17%	83%	39/40
Policy to inform students in advance of drills	9%	91%	39
Policy to inform parents in advance of drills	8%	92%	39
Emergency manager is only responsibility	5%	95%	34/35

# VI. APPENDICES

## APPENDIX A

### Division level safety audit recommendations

Per Virginia Code [§ 22.1-279.8](#), all schools in Virginia are required to complete an annual School Safety Audit and all Superintendents are required to establish a safety audit committee to review the completed safety audits from schools in the division. The Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety requires all Superintendents, or their designee, to certify the completion of several components of the safety audit via the survey manager.

School divisions were asked whether they submitted any recommendations to their local school board for physical safety improvements for their division’s schools. There were 305 recommendations reported by 78 school divisions. The recommendation categories are summarized below. Percentages represent the percent that category represents of the 305 recommendations reported.

Safety Audit Recommendations in 2018–2019	
16%	Security cameras: additional, upgrades, integrate with access control, 911 dispatch
14%	Access control (includes 8 secondary access control), vestibules, card readers,
7%	Locks upgrade: improve, classrooms, exterior, key systems
7%	Fencing: additional, install, improvements
7%	Personnel needed (includes 13 SROs, 1 SSO) MH staff, safety coordinator, monitors
5%	Door improvements/replace exterior hardware,
4%	Training: active shooter, safety-related, TA, anti-bully/cyber, emergency medical response
4%	Entrance vestibules: remodel
4%	Radio: improvements, additional, support communication with first responders
3%	Windows (7 need ballistic film) repair, replace
3%	Intercom: upgrade, expand, exterior
3%	Landscape: CPTED, improvements
3%	Lighting: additional, improve interior/exterior
3%	Visitor controls: check in, management system
2%	Building ID for first responders: number exterior doors/windows, building zone ID color coding
2%	Signage: generally and to direct visitors
2%	Building: enhancements/designs to increase safety
2%	Drills: improvements to increase safety
2%	Panic alarm
1%	Grounds: improvements, sidewalks, crosswalks, driveway
1%	Bus/transportation: improvements, radio, parking, bus loop
1%	ID badge/system
1%	Emergency plans: update
1%	Safety-related policy
1%	Partnerships with community, LEAs, emergency responders
3%	Other

## APPENDIX B

### School safety survey questions (survey conducted online)

#### **Welcome to the 2019 Virginia School Safety Survey**

This is a secure, web-based survey conducted by the Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety (VCSCS). Submission of this survey partially fulfills the Virginia School Safety Audit requirement. ([Code of Virginia § 22.1-279.8](#)). <https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter14/section22.1-279.8/>

While answering the following survey questions, please base your responses on the conditions in your school during the 2018–2019 school year, unless otherwise instructed. You are required to provide a response to each survey question in order to complete the survey. Throughout the survey, there are questions that reference *Code of Virginia* requirements. Click on the citation to review the *Code* language before responding to the related survey question.

Should you have any questions or experience technical problems with the survey, contact the VCSCS: Shellie Evers at 804-629-7042 or [shellie.evers@dcjs.virginia.gov](mailto:shellie.evers@dcjs.virginia.gov), James Christian at 804-357-0967 or [james.christian@dcjs.virginia.gov](mailto:james.christian@dcjs.virginia.gov), or Donna Michaelis at 804-371-6506 or [donna.michaelis@dcjs.virginia.gov](mailto:donna.michaelis@dcjs.virginia.gov).

Questions contained in this survey may elicit responses that are exempt from public release pursuant to *Code of Virginia* § [2.2-3705.2](#) and § [22.1-279.8](#). Each public body is responsible for exercising its discretion in determining whether such exemptions will be invoked. The Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services' (DCJS) Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety will report aggregate survey data for all schools and divisions and will not share individual school responses unless otherwise required by state law.

***Please answer the following questions about your school as accurately as possible.***

#### **I. SCHOOL IDENTIFICATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION**

1. What is the name of your school division? (*select from drop-down list*)

2. What is the *full* name of your school?

**IMPORTANT:** School name must match our database for you to receive credit for the survey. Please use this link to find the formal school name, then copy and paste into this box.

3. What is your school's ID number?

**IMPORTANT:** ID number must match your school name for you to receive credit for the survey. Please use this link to find the 4-digit ID number, then copy and paste into this box.

*If we have any questions about your survey responses, we would like to be able to contact you. Please provide us with your contact information:*

4. What is your name?

(First name/Last name)

5. Are you the school's current/acting principal?

Yes

No

(if 5 = no)

5a. Please provide the name and email address for your current/acting principal.

(First name/Last name/Email)

(if 5 = no)

6. What is your title?

(if 5 = no)

7. What is your email address?

8. Which of the following best describes your school? (select one)

- |                             |                               |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Elementary                  | Charter                       |
| Middle                      | Magnet                        |
| High                        | Governor’s                    |
| Combined Grades             | Special Education             |
| Primary                     | Correctional Education        |
| Pre-Kindergarten            | Adult Education               |
| Alternative                 | School for the Deaf and Blind |
| Career/Technical/Vocational | Other (describe) ____         |

9. What grades were taught at your school during 2018–2019? (select all that apply)

- |                       |                        |
|-----------------------|------------------------|
| Pre-Kindergarten      | 7 <sup>th</sup> grade  |
| Kindergarten          | 8 <sup>th</sup> grade  |
| 1 <sup>st</sup> grade | 9 <sup>th</sup> grade  |
| 2 <sup>nd</sup> grade | 10 <sup>th</sup> grade |
| 3 <sup>rd</sup> grade | 11 <sup>th</sup> grade |
| 4 <sup>th</sup> grade | 12 <sup>th</sup> grade |
| 5 <sup>th</sup> grade | Not applicable         |
| 6 <sup>th</sup> grade |                        |

10. What was your fall membership enrollment number on September 30, 2018?

(enter numeric response)

**II. SAFETY-RELATED PERSONNEL AND PARTNERSHIPS**

*Mental Health Professionals*

11. What was the number of full time and part time school-based mental health personnel (counselor, psychologist, social worker, substance abuse counselor) who allocated at least 50% of their employed time providing mental health services in 2018–2019?

- Use full time for those mental health personnel that worked full time at your school and whose primary role (50% or more of their employed time) was to provide counseling services to students.
- Use part time for those mental health personnel that worked part time at your school and whose primary role (50% or more of their employed time) was to provide counseling services to students, even if they are employed full time by your division or other agency.

If there were none, enter 0.

	Number in 2018–2019
Full-time	
Part-time	

*School Resource Officers and School Security Officers*

§ 9.1-101 defines school resource officers and school security officers.

<https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/9.1-101/>

“School resource officer” means a certified law enforcement officer hired by the local law enforcement agency to provide law enforcement and security services to Virginia public elementary and secondary schools.

“Certified school security officer” means an individual who is employed by the local school board for the singular purpose of maintaining order and discipline, preventing crime, investigating violations of school board policies, and detaining students violating the law or school board policies on school property or at school-sponsored events and who is responsible solely for ensuring the safety, security, and welfare of all students, faculty, staff, and visitors in the assigned school.

2019 VIRGINIA SCHOOL AND DIVISION SAFETY SURVEY RESULTS

12. Did you have safety/security personnel such as School Resource Officers (SROs), Certified School Security Officers (SSOs), or contracted private security personnel working at your school during the 2018–2019 school year? (include both full time and part time personnel)

- Yes
- No

(if 12 = yes)

12a. What type(s) of safety/security personnel were working in your school during the 2018–2019 school year?

	Have at your school?	
School Resource Officers (SROs)	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No
Certified School Security Officers (SSOs)	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No
Contracted private security personnel	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No

(if 12a SRO = yes)

How many SROs regularly worked at your school during normal school hours? (numerical response only) \_\_\_\_

(if 12a SSO = yes)

How many SSOs regularly worked at your school during normal school hours? (numerical response only) \_\_\_\_

(if 12a private security personnel = yes)

How many private security personnel regularly worked at your school during normal school hours? (numerical response only) \_\_\_\_

School Resource Officer (SRO) questions

(If 12a = SRO)

12a-1. In a previous question, you indicated that your school had   (#  ) SRO(s) working in 2018–2019. Please provide the name, FT/PT status, and email address for each (for up to 5 SROs).

Include both full time and part time SROs. If an SRO that worked at your school in 2018–2019 is no longer there, please note it in the “SRO email” text box.

(Based on the number of SROs reported in Q12a, that number of rows will appear in Q12a-1, for up to 5 SROs.)

SRO name (First name/Last name)	FT/PT status		SRO email
	FT	PT	
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	

In 2017, the VCSCS produced a model MOU for school divisions and law enforcement agencies to use as a template for school-law enforcement partnerships. Use of the model MOU for school board-law enforcement agreements will be required by law as of July 1, 2019 for those employing SROs.

12a-2. In 2018–2019, did your school division have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with local law enforcement for the placement of school resource officers (SROs) in your school division?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

(if 12a-2 = yes)

12a-2.1. How familiar are you (the principal) with the roles and expectations set out in the MOU? (select one)

- Not at all familiar
- Slightly familiar
- Somewhat familiar
- Moderately familiar
- Extremely familiar

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12a-3. For the most recently assigned SRO at your school, was the principal or assistant principal a part of the selection process?

- Yes
- No
- Other (describe) \_\_\_\_

12a-4. Do you agree that teachers would benefit from more training about the role of the SROs in your school? (select one)

- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Neutral
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

Certified School Security Officer (SSO) questions

(If 12a = SSO)

12a-5. Were the SSOs working in your school in 2018–2019 supervised at the school or division level? (select one)

- School level
- Division level

(if 12a-5 = school level)

12a-5.1. Please provide the name, title, and email address for the person that was responsible for supervising your school’s SSOs.

- Name
- Title
- Email

12a-6. In a previous question, you indicated that your school had   (#)   SSO(s) working in 2018–2019. Please provide the name, FT/PT status, and email address for each.

*Include both full time and part time SSOs, for up to ten (10) SROs. If an SSO that worked at your school in 2018–2019 is no longer there, please note it in the “SSO email” text box.*

*(Based on the number of SSOs reported in Q12a, that number of rows will appear in Q12a-6, for up to 10 SSOs.)*

SSO name (First name/Last name)	FT/PT status		SSO email
	FT	PT	
	o	o	

**III. EMERGENCY PLANNING, DRILLS, AND RESPONSE**

*School Crisis/Emergency Management/Medical Response Plan*

Virginia Code § 22.1-279.8 states that “each school board shall ensure that every school that it supervises shall develop a written school crisis, emergency management, and medical response plan.”

<https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter14/section22.1-279.8/>

13. Did you have to *activate* any portion of your school’s crisis management plan during the 2018–2019 school year due to an *actual* critical event or emergency?

- Yes
- No

*Safety-Related Conditions*

14. Did first responders (police/fire/EMS) have electronic/internet-based access to current floor plans for your school in case they needed to respond to a large-scale security incident at your facility?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

15. Did your school inform students, parents, and/or faculty and staff in advance about upcoming drills or exercises (lockdown, fire, shelter-in-place, etc.)?

	Informed in advance?
Students	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No
Parents	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No
Faculty/staff	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No

*(if 15 students = yes)*

15a. You reported that your school informed students in advance about upcoming drills, etc. How much in advance?

- 24 hours or more
- Informed immediately prior to
- Other *(describe)* \_\_\_\_\_

*(if 15 parents = yes)*

15b. You reported that your school informed parents in advance about upcoming drills, etc. How much in advance?

- 24 hours or more
- Informed immediately prior to
- Other *(describe)* \_\_\_\_\_

*(if 15 faculty/staff = yes)*

15c. You reported that your school informed faculty/staff in advance about upcoming drills, etc. How much in advance?

- 24 hours or more
- Informed immediately prior to
- Other *(describe)* \_\_\_\_\_

16. Did first responders have access to the school during a lockdown so they would not have to breach doors or windows to gain access, if necessary?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

17. Could school administrators communicate with law enforcement/first responders via radio when inside the school building during an emergency or critical incident, if necessary?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

*(if 17 = no)*

17a. Why not? What prevents this communication? \_\_\_\_\_

18. Review the following list of security strategies and select those that were in place at your school during the 2018–2019 school year. *(select all that apply)*

- All classrooms in the school were able to be locked from both the inside and the outside of the classroom
- All exterior entrances to the school building or campus were locked during school hours
- Main entrance of the school building or campus was secured by a controlled electronic access system during school hours

2019 VIRGINIA SCHOOL AND DIVISION SAFETY SURVEY RESULTS

- Someone was stationed at the front entrance of the school at all times during school hours to
- ensure that visitors report to the main office for visitor check in
- The school had a designated reunification site in case of evacuation or other emergency preventing student pick up at the school
- The school had a checklist available to assist in obtaining pertinent information during a threatening call/communication (e.g., bomb threat)
- Other (describe) \_\_\_\_\_
- None of the above

**IV. THREAT REPORTING AND ASSESSMENT**

Since 2013, and in accordance with § 9.1-184, threat assessment teams are legislatively mandated in Virginia for all public schools and campuses for grades K – college. This process is designed to be preventative, not punitive. It is also mandated that each team:

- Provide guidance to students, faculty, and staff regarding recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community, school, or self;
- Identify members of the school community to whom threatening behavior should be reported; and
- Implement school board policies for the assessment of and intervention with individuals whose behavior poses a threat to the safety of school staff or students.

In addition to requiring the establishment of threat assessment teams, *Code of Virginia § 22.1-79.4* also instructs that

*“Each threat assessment team established pursuant to this section shall report quantitative data on its activities according to guidance developed by the Department of Criminal Justice Services.”*

<https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter7/section22.1-79.4/>

**The questions in this section should be answered in consultation with a knowledgeable member of your threat assessment team.**

Threat Assessment Administration

Threat Assessment Team

*Code of Virginia § 22.1-79.4 section C states, “Each division superintendent shall establish, for each school, a threat assessment team that **shall include persons with expertise in counseling, instruction, school administration, and law enforcement.** Threat assessment teams may be established to serve one or more schools as determined by the division superintendent.”*

19. How many members did your school’s threat assessment (TA) team have in 2018–2019?

(numerical response only) \_\_\_\_\_

*(if 19 = >10, this message will appear.)*

*You responded that your school’s threat assessment team had more than ten members. Next, you will be asked to provide information about 10 of those members. Please provide information for the ten most essential members.*

*(if 19 = 1 or >)*

*(a row will appear for each TA team member based on the number of members reported – for up to 10)*

19a. Please provide the name, title, area of expertise (mental health counseling, instruction, school administration, law enforcement, other), and training status for each threat assessment team member.

First name	Last name	Title	Area of expertise (select one)	Completed TA training in past 3 years?
			<input type="radio"/> MH counsel <input type="radio"/> instruct <input type="radio"/> sch admin <input type="radio"/> law enf <input type="radio"/> other	<input type="radio"/> yes <input type="radio"/> no <input type="radio"/> don’t know

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20. Approximately how many times did the threat assessment team meet in 2018–2019? (A meeting includes at least two (2) members conferring about a threat assessment matter.)  
(numerical response only) \_\_\_\_\_

(if 20 = 1 or >)

20a. Of these (#) threat assessment team meetings, estimate the number of meetings where representatives from all four areas of expertise attended. (numerical response only) \_\_\_\_\_

21. In 2018–2019, how did your school inform students about threat assessment teams and their role in the school?  
(select all that apply)

- Student handbook/Code of Conduct
- Assembly/classroom
- Website/social media
- Email/text
- Other written format (brochure, letter)
- Did not inform
- Other (describe) \_\_\_\_\_

22. In 2018–2019, how did your school inform faculty and staff about threat assessment teams and their role in the school? (select all that apply)

- Staff/faculty handbook or Code of Conduct
- Assembly/group meeting
- Website/social media
- Email/text
- Other written format (brochure, letter)
- Other (describe) \_\_\_\_\_
- Did not inform

Threat Assessment Records

23. Where were threat assessment records (such as *Student Threat Assessment and Response Reports*) stored during 2018–2019? (select all that apply)

- At the division office (central office)
- With law enforcement unit records (as allowed by FERPA)
- With school administrator’s file
- Other (describe) \_\_\_\_\_
- Not applicable (no cases in 2018–2019)

Threat Reporting

24. Did your school have a web-based, anonymous text or tip line (for use with computer or smart phone) for reporting threats/aberrant behavior?

- Yes
- No

Threat Assessments Conducted in 2018–2019

For the next series of questions, we want to know about the threat assessments conducted by your school’s threat assessment team.

- For all threat assessment questions in this section, **only include cases in which there was time to conduct a threat assessment prior to the threatened act being completed.** (Some examples: If a student makes a verbal threat and then attacked that individual before the threat assessment was initiated, do not include that incident as a threat assessment case. If there is a fight between students and there was no advance threat assessment conducted prior to the fight and no reason to believe there was a risk of ongoing violence between the students, do not include incident as a threat assessment case.)

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For question 25:

- Report the number of cases regardless of their risk classification
- Use the following definitions:

- **Threatened others only:** *threatened harm, posed harm to, or was perceived as posing harm to someone other than self, BUT DID NOT threaten suicide or self-harm*
- **Threatened other(s) and self:** *threatened harm, posed harm to, or was perceived as posing harm to someone other than self AND threatened suicide or self-harm, or was perceived as suicidal or posing harm to self*
- **Threatened self only:** *threatened to commit suicide or self-harm, or was perceived as suicidal or posing harm to self*

25. Based on the threat assessment cases conducted at your school in 2018–2019, how many cases involved threats made by persons from each of the following groups?

Enter the number of threat assessments conducted that involved persons from each of the listed groups and the type of threat that was made.

- If no threat assessment cases involved persons from a listed group or threats of a certain type, enter 0 for number of threat assessment cases conducted.
- SUM your responses by type of group (add each row's entries and provide sum), and
- SUM your responses by type of threat (add each column's entries and provide sum).

Type of Group	Threatened other(s) only	Threatened self only	Threatened both self & other(s)	SUM
1. Student from your school				
2. Student not from your school				
3. Student formerly from your school				
4. Faculty/staff currently employed by your school				
5. Faculty/staff formerly employed by your school				
6. Parent/guardian of a student				
7. Someone else				
ENTER TOTAL (SUM of items 1 – 7)				

(if Q25 line 8 TOTAL SUM = 1 or >, go to Q26; if = 0, go to Q30)

26. Of the   (#) threat assessment(s) conducted by your school in 2018–2019, in how many cases did the threat that was made, or a related act, ultimately occur? (include all threat levels: low, medium and high threats) (if none, enter 0) \_\_\_\_\_

(if Q25 line 8 TOTAL SUM = 1 or >, go to Q27; if = 0, go to Q30)

27. Of the   (#) threat assessment(s) conducted by your school in 2018–2019, how many were conducted **within the following time intervals** of the threat being received by the threat assessment team (TAT)? (if none, enter 0)

	Number of threat assessments conducted
Conducted immediately after received by TAT	
Conducted within 24 hours of receipt by TAT	
Conducted after 24 hours or more of receipt by TAT	

(The sum of the above responses to each interval should equal the number of all threat assessments conducted.)

(if Q25 line 1 SUM = 0, go to Q30; if = 1, go to Q28; if = 2 or >, go to Q29)

(if Q25 line 1 SUM = 1)

28. In the threat assessment case you reported **that involved a student from your school:**

Was the student recommended to have a clinical assessment conducted by a community-based or private licensed mental health professional (community services board, private provider, etc.)?	<input type="radio"/> yes <input type="radio"/> no <input type="radio"/> don't know
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Did the student undergo clinical assessment conducted by a community-based or private licensed mental health professional (community services board, private provider, etc.) <b>before</b> being permitted to continue at the school?	<input type="radio"/> yes <input type="radio"/> no <input type="radio"/> don't know
Was the threat classified at the <i>highest</i> threat level ( <i>imminent/high risk, very serious substantive</i> ) at any point in the threat assessment process?	<input type="radio"/> yes <input type="radio"/> no

(if Q25 line 1 SUM = 2 or >)

29. Of the   (#) threat assessment cases you reported **that involved students from your school**:

Were any of the students recommended to have a clinical assessment conducted by a community-based or private licensed mental health professional (community services board, private provider, etc.)?	<input type="radio"/> yes <input type="radio"/> no <input type="radio"/> don't know
Did any of the students undergo a clinical assessment conducted by a community-based or private licensed mental health professional (community services board, private provider, etc.) <b>before</b> being permitted to continue at the school?	<input type="radio"/> yes <input type="radio"/> no <input type="radio"/> don't know
Were any of the threats classified at the <i>highest</i> threat level ( <i>imminent/high risk, very serious substantive</i> ) at any point in the threat assessment process?	<input type="radio"/> yes <input type="radio"/> no

(if 29 item 1 = yes)

29a. How many of the students that were subjects of the   (#) threat assessment cases you reported that involved students from your school, were recommended to have a clinical assessment conducted by a community-based or private licensed mental health professional (community services board, private provider, etc.)? (if none, **enter 0**) \_\_\_\_

(if 29 item 2 = yes)

29b. How many of the students that were subjects of the   (#) threat assessment cases you reported that involved students from your school, underwent a clinical assessment conducted by a community-based or private licensed mental health professional (community services board, private provider, etc.) **before** being permitted to continue at the school? (if none, **enter 0**) \_\_\_\_

(if 29 item 3 = yes)

29c. In how many of the   (#) threat assessment cases you reported that involved students from your school, were the threats classified at the *highest* threat level (*imminent/high risk, very serious substantive*) at any point in the threat assessment process? (if none, **enter 0**) \_\_\_\_

(Number entered in Q29 a, b, or c, should not be greater than the sum of line 1 in Q25.)

If Q28 item 3 = yes, go to Q28a; if = no, go to Q30

If Q29 c = 0, go to Q30; if = 1, go to Q28a; if = 2 or >, go to Q29d

(if Q28 item 3 = yes, or if Q29c = 1)

28a. In the high threat level case you reported in question 28, did the threat ultimately occur (was carried out or some other act of violence occurred)?

Yes

No

If Q28a = no, go to Q30; If Q28a = yes, go to C-1 below.

(if Q29c = 2 or >)

29d. Of the   # cases you reported at the highest threat level in question 29c, in how many cases did the threat or some other act of violence ultimately occur?

Number of cases \_\_\_\_ (if none, **enter 0**)

(The number entered in response to Q29d should not be greater than the number reported in Q29c.)

If Q29d = 0, go to Q30; if = 1, go to C-1 below; if = 2 or >, go to C-1 on p12

(if Q28a = yes, or if Q29d = 1)

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For the case that was carried out, please provide a brief description of what occurred.

C-1. You indicated that in the high threat level case reported in question 28, a serious event ultimately occurred. Please describe:

The type of act that was threatened: \_\_\_\_

The actual act that took place: \_\_\_\_

The steps taken, if any, to try to prevent the act: \_\_\_\_

Was a student from your school the primary initiator of the event? Yes/No (if no, go to C-3)

(if C-1 student from your school = yes)

C-2. Was this student able to continue attending your school at some time after the event?

Yes

No (if selected, go to C-3)

There was more than one student considered primary in the event (if selected, go to C-3)

(if C-2 = yes)

C-2.1. After what period of time was the student able to continue attending your school? (select one)

Immediately

5 school days

10 school days

11–45 school days

More than 45 school days

After alternative school placement (if "after alt..." was not selected, go to C-3)

After hospitalization

Other (describe) \_\_\_\_

(if C-2.1 "after alternative ..." was selected)

C-2.2. For what period of time was the student assigned to alternative school placement? \_\_\_\_

C-3. Is there any other information about this event that you think would help explain the event to us?

Yes (if selected, a dialogue box will appear for their response, then will be directed to Q30)

No (if selected, go to Q30)

(if 29d > 1)

In question 29d, you indicated that in \_\_\_#\_\_\_ high threat level cases reported, a serious event ultimately occurred. You will be asked to briefly describe each of the events, one case at a time, for up to 10 cases.

If you have more than 10 cases where high level threats were carried out, please describe the 10 most serious cases.

**Case 1**

C-1. Please describe the events in Case 1:

The type of act that was threatened: \_\_\_\_

The actual act that took place: \_\_\_\_

The steps taken, if any, to try to prevent the act: \_\_\_\_

Was a student from your school the primary initiator of the event? Yes/No (if no, go to C-3)

(if C-1 student from your school = yes)

2C-2. Was this student able to continue attending your school at some time after the event?

Yes

No (if selected, go to C-3)

There was more than one student considered primary in Case 1. (if selected, go to C-3)

(if C-2 = yes)

C-2.1. After what period of time was the student in Case 1 able to continue attending your school?

(select one)

Immediately

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- 5 school days
- 10 school days
- 11–45 school days
- More than 45 school days
- After alternative school placement *(if “after alt...” was not selected, go to C-3)*
- After hospitalization
- Other *(describe)* \_\_\_\_\_

*(if C-2.1 = after alt)*

C-2.2. For what period of time was the student in Case 1 assigned to alternative school placement? \_\_\_\_\_

C-3. Is there any other information about this event that you think would help explain the event to us?

Yes *(if selected, a dialogue box will appear for their response, then will be directed to Case 2)*

No *(if selected, go to Case 2)*

*(if 29d is = or > 2)*

**Case 2**

C-1. Please describe the events in Case 2:

The type of act that was threatened: \_\_\_\_\_

The actual act that took place: \_\_\_\_\_

The steps taken, if any, to try to prevent the act: \_\_\_\_\_

Was a student from your school the primary initiator of the event? Yes/No *(if no, go to C-3)*

*(if C-1 = student from your school = yes)*

C-2. Was this student able to continue attending your school at some time after the event?

Yes

No *(if selected, go to C-3)*

There was more than one student considered primary in Case 2. *(if selected, go to C-3)*

*(if C-2 = yes)*

C-2.1. After what period of time was the student in Case 2 able to continue attending your school? *(select one)*

- Immediately
- 5 school days
- 10 school days
- 11–45 school days
- More than 45 school days
- After alternative school placement *(if “after alt...” was not selected, go to C-3)*
- After hospitalization
- Other *(describe)* \_\_\_\_\_

*(if C-2.1 = after alt)*

C-2.2. For what period of time was the student in Case 2 assigned to alternative school placement? \_\_\_\_\_

C-3. Is there any other information about this event that you think would help explain the event to us?

Yes *(if selected, a dialogue box will appear for their response)*

No

*If 29d = 3 or > go to Case 3; if 29d = 2, go to Q30*

**(Same set of questions/conditions will be asked if the following criteria are present)**

Case 3 (if 29d = or > 3 cases)  
 Case 4 (if 29d = or > 4 cases)  
 Case 5 (if 29d = or > 5 cases)  
 Case 6 (if 29d = or > 6 cases)

Case 7 (if 29d = or > 7 cases)  
 Case 8 (if 29d = or > 8 cases)  
 Case 9 (if 29d = or > 9 cases)  
 Case 10 (if 29d = or > 10 cases)

(if 25 line 7 "someone else" SUM > 0)

29e. In question 25, where you detailed the types of threats made and by whom, you indicated that your school had a threat assessment case(s) that involved "someone else" (not a student, parent, or faculty). Please describe this/these person's relationship(s) to your school. \_\_\_\_\_

30. What mechanisms were in place to make faculty and staff aware of threat assessment protocols and how to recognize threatening or aberrant behavior? *(select all that apply)*

Information provided at back-to-school meetings

Information provided at other staff meetings

In-service training

Required online training video (such as, *K12 Threat Assessment in Virginia Schools*, an instructional video for school staff, parents, and community members provided by DCJS)

Other *(describe)* \_\_\_\_

None

## V. CONCERNS, TRAINING, AND RESOURCE NEEDS

### Safety-Related Training

31. What type(s) of school safety training is most needed by your school's administration/faculty/staff? *(select all that apply)*

Alternatives to suspension and expulsion

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

Crisis planning, prevention and response (to include school safety drills, bomb threat response, crisis response options, crisis intervention and recovery – all hazards)

De-escalation and mediation

Gang awareness

Mental health problem awareness and recognition

Peer relations (dating violence, bullying, bystander intervention, conflict mediation, sexual harassment, etc.)

Safety and security site assessments

School-wide positive behavior supports (to include: PBIS, RTI, VTSS)

Security technology and hardware

Social/emotional interventions and supports

Social media (Facebook, Snapchat, Twitter, YouTube, etc.)

Suicide prevention and intervention

Threat assessment team training

Trauma-informed care

Trauma-informed classrooms

Violence prevention training (including fighting, armed intruder, active shooter, other school violence)

Other *(describe)* \_\_\_\_

None of the above

32. In 2018–2019, was someone at the school administration level specifically responsible (such as, it is in their job description) for monitoring social media (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, etc.) to detect and mitigate potential threats and other safety issues?

Yes

No

Don't know

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33. What was the *prime* issue affecting your school in 2018–2019 as it pertained to the physical safety and well-being of **students**? (*select one*)
- Inability to secure classrooms
  - Lack of designated security personnel
  - Lack of fencing or other peripheral security
  - Lack of supervision in one or more classrooms
  - Multiple building/portable classrooms
  - Physical dangers from unfunded repairs
  - Unsupervised areas during the school day
  - Unsupervised after school activities
  - Other (*describe*) \_\_\_\_\_
34. What was the *prime* issue affecting your school in 2018–2019 as it pertained to the physical safety and well-being of **staff**? (*select one*)
- Inability to secure classrooms
  - Lack of designated security personnel
  - Lack of fencing or other peripheral security
  - Lack of supervision in one or more classrooms
  - Multiple building/portable classrooms
  - Physical dangers from unfunded repairs
  - Unsupervised areas during the school day
  - Unsupervised after school activities
  - Other (*describe*) \_\_\_\_\_
35. What was the *prime* issue affecting your school in 2018–2019 as it pertained to the mental and emotional safety and well-being of **students**? (*select one*)
- Bullying
  - Counseling personnel tasked with non-mental health-related assignments
  - Lack of available climate improvement training
  - Lack of connection with other students
  - Lack of connection with teachers/staff
  - Lack of counseling personnel for students
  - Retaining qualified teachers
  - Unmet mental health needs/limited mental health resources
  - Other (*describe*) \_\_\_\_\_
36. What was the *prime* issue affecting your school in 2018–2019 as it pertained to the mental and emotional safety and well-being of **staff**? (*select one*)
- Bullying
  - Counseling personnel tasked with non-mental health-related assignments
  - Lack of available climate improvement training
  - Lack of connection with students
  - Lack of connection with other teachers/staff
  - Lack of counseling personnel for students
  - Retaining qualified teachers
  - Unmet mental health needs/limited mental health resources
  - Other (*describe*) \_\_\_\_\_

**Thank you for completing the 2019 Virginia School Safety Survey.**

Your survey responses were successfully submitted to the Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety at the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services.

## Resources:

### School Safety Audit Program

[Virginia School Safety Audit Infographic](#)

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### Crisis and Emergency Planning

[Critical Incident Response Video](#)

[Critical Incident Response for School Faculty and Staff](#)

[School Crisis, Emergency Management and Medical Emergency Response Plan](#)

[School Crisis, Emergency Management and Medical Emergency Response Plan-Quick Guide](#)

[Guidance on Emergency Manager Designee](#)

[Guidance for School Systems in the Event Victims Arise from an Emergency 2018](#)

[Virginia Educator's Drill Guide](#)

[Guidance on Required Evacuation/Fire and Lockdown Drills 2016](#)

[Virginia Schools Bus Driver and Monitor Safety and Security Manual](#)

[Virginia Schools Bus Driver and Monitor Video](#)

[Academic Community Exercise Starter Kit](#)

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### Threat Assessment

[Threat Assessment in Virginia Public Schools: Model Policies, Procedures and Guidelines](#) – pdf

[Threat Assessment in Virginia Public Schools: Model Policies, Procedures and Guidelines](#) – MSWord

[K-12 Threat Assessment in Virginia: A Prevention Overview for School Staff, Parents, and Community Members](#)

[K-12 Threat Assessment Video](#)

[K-12 Threat Assessment Form](#) – Fillable pdf

[K-12 Threat Assessment Form](#) – Fillable MSWord

[Technical Assistance for Threat Assessment and Management Teams for Virginia Schools and Institutions of Higher Education](#)

[Threat Management Consultant – Request for Services](#)

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### Bullying and School Climate

[School Climate, Student Engagement and Academic Achievement](#)

[Preventing Teen Dating Violence: Interactive Guide on Informing Policy](#)

[US DOE School Climate and Discipline Packet](#)

[Suicide and bullying: Issue brief \(SPRC\)](#)

[Bullying: The Relationship Between Bullying and Suicide: What We Know and What it Means for Schools](#)

[Model Policy to Address Bullying in Virginia Schools \(DOE\)](#)

[Preventing Youth Suicide – National Association of School Psychologists](#)

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### Additional K-12 Resources

[Juvenile Law Handbook for School Administrators](#)

[U.S. Department of Education Acts on School Safety Report Recommendation to Improve Understanding of Student Privacy Law](#)

[Legislative Summary For Schools](#)

APPENDIX C

Division safety survey questions (survey conducted online)

**Welcome to the 2019 Virginia School Division Survey**

This is a secure, web-based survey conducted by the Department of Criminal Justice Services’ (DCJS) Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety (VCSCS). Submission of this survey partially fulfills the Virginia School Safety Audit requirement. ([Code of Virginia § 22.1-279.8](#)). <https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter14/section22.1-279.8/>

While answering the following survey questions, please base your responses on the conditions in your division during the 2018–2019 school year, unless otherwise instructed. You are required to provide a response to each survey question in order to complete the survey. Throughout the survey, there are questions that reference *Code of Virginia* requirements. Click on the citation to review the *Code* language before responding to the related survey question.

Should you have any questions or experience technical problems with the survey, contact the VCSCS: Shellie Evers at 804-629-7042 or [shellie.evers@dcjs.virginia.gov](mailto:shellie.evers@dcjs.virginia.gov), James Christian at 804-357-0967 or [james.christian@dcjs.virginia.gov](mailto:james.christian@dcjs.virginia.gov), or Donna Michaelis at 804-371-6506 or [donna.michaelis@dcjs.virginia.gov](mailto:donna.michaelis@dcjs.virginia.gov).

Questions contained in this survey may elicit responses that are exempt from public release pursuant to *Code of Virginia* § 2.2-3705.2 and § 22.1-279.8. Each public body is responsible for exercising its discretion in determining whether such exemptions will be invoked. The Department of Criminal Justice Services’ (DCJS) Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety will report aggregate survey data for all schools and divisions and will not share individual division responses unless otherwise required by state law.

**I. DIVISION IDENTIFICATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION**

1. What is the name of your school division? (select from drop down list)

*If we have any questions about your survey responses, we would like to be able to contact you. Please provide us with your contact information:*

2. What is your name? (First Name/Last Name)

3. Are you the division’s current/acting superintendent?

Yes

No

(if 3= no)

3a. Please provide the name and email address for your current/acting superintendent.

(First Name/Last Name/Email)

3b. What is your title?

3c. What is your email address?

**II. SAFETY-RELATED PERSONNEL AND PARTNERSHIPS**

4. Among the schools in your school division during 2018–2019, what was the number of full time and of part time school-based mental health personnel (**counselor, psychologist, social worker, substance abuse counselor**) who allocated at least 50% of their employed time providing mental health services, and
- were hired by the school division to serve specific schools or a combination of schools,
  - work in the schools through a day treatment program, and/or
  - work in the schools through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with a community agency?

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If there were none, enter 0.

	# hired by division	# day treatment program staff	# MOU with community agency
Full time			
Part time			

5. Was there a Director of School Safety or Director of School Security (or person of similar title whose responsibility was the oversight of school safety-related activities) employed within the school division?

Yes  
No

(if 5 = yes)

5a. Please provide the name and email for the person designated as the school division’s Director of School Safety/Security or similar designation.

(First Name/Last Name/Email)

§ 22.1-279.8. paragraph D requires that each school division designate an emergency manager.

<https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter14/section22.1-279.8/>

6. Was your division’s Emergency Manager hired to serve specifically in this role, or did they assume this responsibility in addition to another role? (select one)

The Emergency Manger position was their only responsibility.  
The Emergency Manager responsibilities was in addition to their other role(s).  
The responsibilities of an Emergency Manager was split among multiple individuals.  
Other (describe) \_\_\_\_

7. Please provide the name and email address for the person designated as the division’s Emergency Manager.

(First Name/Last Name/Email)

In 2017, the VCSCS produced a model memorandum of understanding (MOU) for school divisions and law enforcement agencies to use as a template for school board-law enforcement partnerships. Use of the model MOU for school board-law enforcement agreements will be required by law as of July 1, 2019 for those employing school resource officers (SROs).

§ 22.1-280.2:3. School boards; local law-enforcement agencies; memorandums of understanding <http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/leap604.exe?191+sum+HB1733>

8. In 2018–2019, did your division have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in place to facilitate the partnership between schools and law enforcement?

Yes  
No

(if 8 = yes)

8a. Did you disseminate this information to the administrators/staff of all of your division’s schools?

Yes  
No  
Other (describe) \_\_\_\_

(if 8a = yes)

8a-1. Did you provide training to school personnel on the roles and responsibilities of SROs?

Yes  
No

2019 VIRGINIA SCHOOL AND DIVISION SAFETY SURVEY RESULTS

9. What type(s) of security personnel worked in your division during the 2018–2019 school year? *(select all that apply)*

- School resource officer (SRO)
- Certified school security officer (SSO)
- Private security officer
- None of the above

*(if 9 = SRO)*

9a. How were school resource officers (SROs) funded in your division? *(select one)*

- Solely by the school division
- Solely by a law enforcement agency (LEA)
- Through grant funds from DCJS (SRO Grant Fund and Program)
- From a combination of division and LEA funds
- Don't know
- Other *(describe)* \_\_\_\_

*(if 9 = SSO)*

9b. Were the SSOs working in your school division supervised at the school or division level? *(select one)*

- School level
- Division level

*(if 9b = division level)*

9b-1. Please provide the name, title, and email address for the person responsible for supervising your division's SSOs.

- Name
- Title
- Email

*(if 9 = SSO)*

§ 22.1-280.2:1 describes the purposes for which a local school board may employ a certified school security officer (SSO) and the requirements if they are to carry a firearm.

<https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter14/section22.1-280.2:1/>

9c. What is your division's current policy on allowing SSOs to be armed? *(select one)*

- SSOs are allowed to be armed in division schools
- SSOs are not allowed to be armed in division schools, and we are not considering changing this policy in the near future
- We do not currently allow SSOs to be armed, but are considering allowing it
- Other *(describe)*

10. Did your division apply for SRO grant funds last year?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

*(if 10 = no)*

10a. Why did your division not apply for SRO funds last year? *(select one)*

- All SRO positions currently funded through local funding and therefore were not eligible
- Not aware of grant opportunity
- Applied and denied funding
- Not interested in funding SRO positions
- Other *(describe)* \_\_\_\_

**Questions 11 and 12 refer to Code of Virginia § 22.1-279.3:1 paragraphs B and D.**

<https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter14/section22.1-279.3:1/>

§ 22.1-279.3:1. Reports of certain acts to school authorities.

**Paragraph B** details the types of offenses that law enforcement are required to report to school/division authorities when committed by students ...

- if the offense would be a felony if committed by an adult or would be a violation of the Drug Control Act (§ [54.1-3400](#) et seq.) and occurred on a school bus, on school property, or at a school-sponsored activity,
- or would be an adult misdemeanor involving any incidents described in clauses (i) through (viii) of subsection A, while on a school bus, on school property or at a school-sponsored activity;
  - (i) the assault or assault and battery, without bodily injury
  - (ii) the assault and battery that results in bodily injury, sexual assault, death, shooting, stabbing, cutting, or wounding of any person, abduction of any person as described in § [18.2-47](#) or [18.2-48](#), or stalking of any person as described in § [18.2-60.3](#),
  - (iii) any conduct involving alcohol, marijuana, a controlled substance, imitation controlled substance, or an anabolic steroid, including the theft or attempted theft of student prescription medications;
  - (iv) any threats against school personnel
  - (v) the illegal carrying of a firearm, as defined in § [22.1-277.07](#), onto school property;
  - (vi) any illegal conduct involving firebombs, explosive materials or devices, or hoax explosive devices, as defined in § [18.2-85](#), or explosive or incendiary devices, as defined in § [18.2-433.1](#), or chemical bombs, as described in § [18.2-87.1](#),
  - (vii) any threats or false threats to bomb, as described in § [18.2-83](#), made against school personnel or involving school property or school buses; or
  - (viii) the arrest of any student for an incident, including the charge therefor.
- and whether the student is released to the custody of his parent or, if 18 years of age or more, is released on bond.

As part of any report concerning an offense that would be an adult misdemeanor..., local law-enforcement authorities and attorneys for the Commonwealth shall be authorized to disclose information regarding terms of release from detention, court dates, and terms of any disposition orders entered by the court, to the superintendent of such student's school division, upon request by the superintendent, if, ... such disclosure would not jeopardize the investigation or prosecution of the case. No disclosures shall be made pursuant to this section in violation of the confidentiality provisions of subsection A of § [16.1-300](#) or the record retention and redisclosure provisions of § [22.1-288.2](#). Further, any school superintendent who receives notification that a juvenile has committed an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult pursuant to subsection G of § [16.1-260](#) shall report such information to the principal of the school in which the juvenile is enrolled.

**Paragraph D** details the types of offenses that school/division authorities are required to report to law enforcement when committed by students...

... the principal shall immediately report to the local law enforcement agency any act enumerated in clauses (ii) through (vii) of subsection A that may constitute a criminal offense and may report to the local law enforcement agency any incident described in clause (i) of subsection A.

(See listed above.)

Nothing in this section shall require delinquency charges to be filed or prevent schools from dealing with school-based offenses through graduated sanctions or educational programming before a delinquency charge is filed with the juvenile court.

Further, ... the principal shall also immediately report any act enumerated in clauses (ii) through (v) of subsection A that may constitute a criminal offense to the parents of any minor student who is the specific object of such act.

Further, the principal shall report that the incident has been reported to local law enforcement as required by law and that the parents may contact local law enforcement for further information, if they so desire.

11. Were there formal written processes or protocols in place for your school division to receive notification on the Code listed offenses from local law enforcement?

- Yes
- No

12. Were there formal written processes or protocols in place for your division to *provide notification* to law enforcement on the Code listed offenses when committed by students?

- Yes
- No

**III. EMERGENCY PLANNING, DRILLS, AND RESPONSE**

§ 22.1-137.2 describes the requirement for conducting lockdown drills.

<https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter9/section22.1-137.2/>

13. Besides the four (4) required lockdown drills, did you have a division-wide requirement that schools conduct additional lockdown drills?

- Yes
- No

*(if 13 = yes)*

13a. Briefly describe your division’s additional lockdown requirement. \_\_\_\_\_

14. Besides the four (4) required lockdown drills, did your division conduct any additional exercises with law enforcement or other first responders in the past year?

- Yes
- No

*(if 14 = yes)*

14a. What types of additional exercises were they? *(select all that apply)*

- Full-scale drill
- Table top simulation
- Other *(describe)* \_\_\_\_\_

15. Did you have a division-wide policy that required schools to inform students, parents, and/or faculty and staff in advance about an upcoming drill or exercise (lockdown, fire, shelter-in-place, etc.)?

	Policy to inform in advance?	
Students	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No
Parents	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No
Faculty/staff	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No

*(if 15 students = yes)*

15a. You reported that your division had a policy to inform students in advance about upcoming drills, etc. How much in advance? *(select one)*

- 24 hours or more
- Informed immediately prior to
- Other *(describe)* \_\_\_\_\_

*(if 15 parents = yes)*

15b. You reported that your division had a policy to inform parents in advance about upcoming drills, etc. How much in advance? *(select one)*

- 24 hours or more
- Informed immediately prior to
- Other *(describe)* \_\_\_\_\_

*(if 15 faculty/staff = yes)*

15c. You reported that your division had a policy to inform faculty/staff in advance about upcoming drills, etc. How much in advance? *(select one)*

- o 24 hours or more
- o Informed immediately prior to
- o Other (describe) \_\_\_\_\_

§22.1-279.8 paragraph C requires that a division’s school safety audit committee review the schools’ safety audits and submit any plans for improving school safety to the division superintendent for submission to the local school board.  
<https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter14/section22.1-279.8/>

16. Based on the review completed by your division’s safety audit committee, did your school division submit any recommendations to your local school board for improvement regarding *physical safety concerns* of division schools in the 2018–2019 school year?

Yes

No

(if 16 = yes)

16a. Please list the top five recommendations made to the school board by the safety audit committee regarding physical safety concerns.

**Briefly describe recommendations**

- Recommendation 1
- Recommendation 2
- Recommendation 3
- Recommendation 4
- Recommendation 5

**IV. THREAT REPORTING AND ASSESSMENTS**

§ 23.1-805 describes violence prevention committees and threat assessment teams, and requires committees to “provide guidance to students, faculty, and staff regarding recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a physical threat to the community.”

<https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/23.1-805%20/>

17. What mechanisms were in place to provide education related to threatening or aberrant behavior for school faculty/staff? (select all that apply)

Training provided by individual schools

Training provided as part of a division-wide school safety in-service

Required online training video (such as, [K12 Threat Assessment in Virginia Schools](#), an instructional video for school staff, parents, and community members provided by DCJS)

Other (describe) \_\_\_\_\_

None of the above

§ 22.1-79.4 describes the roles of threat assessment teams and oversight committees in school divisions.

<https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter7/section22.1-79.4/>

18. Was there a division oversight team for threat assessment in 2018–2019?

Yes

No

(if 18 = yes)

18a. Please provide the name and email of the person that was in charge of the division oversight team.

(First Name/Last Name/Email)

18b. Which of the following were represented by the members of your oversight team? (select all that apply)

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- Case manager
- Faculty representative
- Guidance counselor
- Human resources
- Law enforcement (SRO or local/state law enforcement)
- Legal counsel
- Public relations/media coordinator
- School health professional/school nurse
- School principal/assistant principal
- School psychologist/other clinically licensed professional
- Superintendent/assistant superintendent
- None of the above

19. Where were threat assessment records (such as *Student Threat Assessment and Response Reports*) stored during 2018–2019? (select all that apply)

- At the Central Office (division office)
- With law enforcement unit records (as allowed by FERPA) <https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/index.html>
- With school administrator’s files
- None of the above

20. In 2018–2019, did your division have operable, division-wide...

electronic/computer-based threat assessment case management tool to assist in the records management of threats?	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No
school safety mobile application (app) for real-time (24/7) crisis intervention services by licensed clinicians (via calls, texts, online chat portals)?	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No
school safety mobile application (app) for students and others to report and receive information about threats or crimes via text, audio, or video/images in real-time (24/7)?	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No

(if 20 item 1 = yes)

20a. Which best describes your division’s threat assessment case management tool? (select one)

- The division created its own system
- We contracted with an outside vendor
- Other (describe) \_\_\_\_\_

(if 20 item 2 = yes)

20b. Which best describes your division’s mobile app for 24/7 crisis intervention services? (select one)

- The division created its own mobile app
- We contracted with an outside vendor
- Other (describe) \_\_\_\_\_

(if 20 item 3 = yes)

20c. Which best describes your division’s mobile app for students and others to report and receive information about threats/crimes? (select one)

- The division created its own mobile app
- We contracted with an outside vendor
- Other (describe) \_\_\_\_\_

(if 20a = outside vendor)

20a-1. What was the name of the outside vendor? \_\_\_\_\_

(if 20b = outside vendor)

20b-1. What was the name of the outside vendor? \_\_\_\_\_

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(if 20c = outside vendor)

20c-1. What was the name of the outside vendor? \_\_\_\_

21. Did your division have a division-wide, web-based, anonymous text or tip line (for use with computer or smart phone) for reporting threats/aberrant behavior?

Yes

No

22. Does your division have a written policy or procedure for notifying local law enforcement or other institutions when a threat is made by students or non-students at your school?

Yes

No

(if 22 = no)

22a. If there were obstacles to sharing information with law enforcement or other institutions, what were they? (select all that apply)

Concern about privacy laws

Lack of knowledge on when to share information

Lack of knowledge with whom to share information

Other (describe) \_\_\_\_

There were no obstacles, and communication occurs regularly, however a written policy is not currently in place.

23. What kind of training or technical assistance would help improve your division's threat assessment (TA) process? (select all that apply)

Additional training by DCJS

Case studies, scenario trainings (social media, harm to self, harm to others)

Level of threat training, when to conduct a TA (how to respond to various threat levels; when does a low-level threat require a TA)

Online training in threat assessment

Recognition of threats, threat types, and behavioral red flags

Refresher training and review

Regional training with other divisions

Specific TA-related topics

Suicide prevention, ideation, threat assessment for suicide threat

Training for new staff

Other (describe) \_\_\_\_

None

24. What were the biggest challenges to setting up threat assessment teams or conducting threat assessments? (select all that apply)

Conducting reviews and updates

Consistency in division-wide practices

Length of the form

Determining level of threat (when does an act become a threat, how to determine a threat's appropriate level, what constitutes a threat)

Limited staff and staff turnover/retention

Loss of instruction time, competing priorities, conducting thorough TA/review/debrief in a timely Privacy issues (FERPA, outside team members maintaining student confidentiality requirements)

Team coordination (managing team member schedules, availability to meet in timely manner)

Threat assessment training resources

Training for new staff and for team members

Understanding the function of threat assessments vs. discipline

Other (describe) \_\_\_\_

None

**V. CONCERNS, TRAINING, AND RESOURCE NEEDS**

25. What was the prime issue affecting the school division in 2018–2019 as it pertained to the *physical* safety and well-being of **students**? (*select one*)
- Inability to secure classrooms
  - Lack of designated security personnel
  - Lack of fencing or other peripheral security
  - Lack of supervision in one or more classrooms
  - Multiple building/portable classrooms
  - Physical dangers from unfunded repairs
  - Unsupervised areas during the school day
  - Unsupervised after school activities
  - Other (*describe*) \_\_\_\_
26. What was the prime issue affecting the school division in 2018–2019 as it pertained to the *physical* safety and well-being of **staff**? (*select one*)
- Inability to secure classrooms
  - Lack of designated security personnel
  - Lack of fencing or other peripheral security
  - Lack of supervision in one or more classrooms
  - Multiple building/portable classrooms
  - Physical dangers from unfunded repairs
  - Unsupervised areas during the school day
  - Unsupervised after school activities
  - Other (*describe*) \_\_\_\_
27. What was the prime issue affecting the school division in 2018–2019 as it pertained to the *mental and emotional* safety and well-being of **students**? (*select one*)
- Lack of available climate improvement training
  - Lack of connection with other students
  - Lack of connection with teachers/staff
  - Lack of in-house counseling/mental health personnel available to assist students
  - Retaining qualified teachers
  - Unmet mental health needs/limited mental health resources in the community
  - Other (*describe*) \_\_\_\_
28. What was the prime issue affecting the school division in 2018–2019 as it pertained to the *mental and emotional* safety and well-being of **staff**? (*select one*)
- Lack of available climate improvement training
  - Lack of connection with students
  - Lack of connection with other teachers/staff
  - Lack of in-house counseling/mental health personnel available to assist students
  - Retaining qualified teachers
  - Unmet mental health needs/limited mental health resources in the community
  - Other (*describe*) \_\_\_\_
29. How did your division monitor social media (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, etc.) to detect and mitigate potential threats and other safety issues? (*select one*)
- Someone at the division level is responsible for monitoring (i.e., it is in their job description)
  - We have contracted a cyber security company to monitor social media for us (e.g., Gaggle, Geolisting, etc.)
  - We do not have a specific monitoring process
  - Other (*describe*) \_\_\_\_

**Thank you for completing the 2019 Division Level Survey.**

## **School Safety Audit Program**

[Virginia School Safety Audit Infographic](#)

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### **Crisis and Emergency Planning**

[Critical Incident Response Video](#)

[Critical Incident Response for School Faculty and Staff](#)

[School Crisis, Emergency Management and Medical Emergency Response Plan](#)

[School Crisis, Emergency Management and Medical Emergency Response Plan—Quick Guide](#)

[Guidance on Emergency Manager Designee](#)

[Guidance for School Systems in the Event Victims Arise from an Emergency 2018](#)

[Virginia Educator's Drill Guide](#)

[Guidance on Required Evacuation/Fire and Lockdown Drills 2016](#)

[Virginia Schools Bus Driver and Monitor Safety and Security Manual](#)

[Virginia Schools Bus Driver and Monitor Video](#)

[Academic Community Exercise Starter Kit](#)

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### **Threat Assessment**

[Threat Assessment in Virginia Public Schools: Model Policies, Procedures and Guidelines](#) – pdf

[Threat Assessment in Virginia Public Schools: Model Policies, Procedures and Guidelines](#) – MSWord

[K-12 Threat Assessment in Virginia: A Prevention Overview for School Staff, Parents, and Community Members](#)

[K-12 Threat Assessment Video](#)

[K-12 Threat Assessment Form](#) – Fillable pdf

[K-12 Threat Assessment Form](#) – Fillable MSWord

[Technical Assistance for Threat Assessment and Management Teams for Virginia Schools and Institutions of Higher Education](#)

[Threat Management Consultant – Request for Services](#)

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### **Bullying and School Climate**

[School Climate, Student Engagement and Academic Achievement](#)

[Preventing Teen Dating Violence: Interactive Guide on Informing Policy](#)

[US DOE School Climate and Discipline Packet](#)

[Suicide and bullying: Issue brief \(SPRC\)](#)

[Bullying: The Relationship Between Bullying and Suicide: What We Know and What it Means for Schools](#)

[Model Policy to Address Bullying in Virginia Schools \(DOE\)](#)

[Preventing Youth Suicide – National Association of School Psychologists](#)

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### **Additional K-12 Resources**

[Juvenile Law Handbook for School Administrators](#)

[U.S. Department of Education Acts on School Safety Report Recommendation to Improve Understanding of Student Privacy Law](#)

[Legislative Summary for Schools](#)



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