**Enhancing Collaborative Partnerships to Identify, Assess, and Manage Risk for Targeted Violence and Terrorism** 

### A COMMUNITY APPROACH TO BEHAVIORAL THREAT ASSESSMENT & MANAGEMENT:

**Enhancing Collaborative Partnerships** to Identify, Assess, and Manage **Risk for Targeted Violence and Terrorism** 

GENE DEISINGER, PH.D.

PRESIDENT

**DEISINGER CONSULTING, LLC** 

**National Threat Assessment Conference for Educational Institutions** October 23, 2023 | Virginia Beach, VA

This training is supported through a grant from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Program.





### Gene Deisinger, Ph.D.

Deisinger Consulting, LLC

### President & Founde **Education, Training & Certifications:**

- Ph.D., Counseling/Clinical Psychology Licensed Psychologist (IA)
- Certified Health Service Provider in Psychology (IA) Certified Law Enforcement Officer (IA & VA: Retired)

### Experience:

- U.S. Department of Justice Critical Incident Review Team SME: Regarding mass casualty incident in Uvalde, TX
- Virginia Center for School & Campus Safety
- Threat Management Consultant (2015-Present)
   Virginia State Police / Virginia Fusion Center
- Consulting Psychologist / Member of Advisory Board Virginia Tech
- Deputy Chief of Police & Director, Threat Management Services (2009-2014)
- JTTF / ATAC Southern District of Iowa
   Special Deputy US Marshal (2001-2009)
- Deputy Chief of Police & Director, Threat Management (1993-2009)



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### **Session Agenda**

### Introduction

- Overview of Threat Assessment and Management
- The Nature and Process of Targeted Violence
- Essential Elements of an Effective BTAM Process:
- · Multi-disciplinary approach to address all threats
- · Coordinated awareness of concerns through engagement
- · Thorough & contextual assessment
- · Proactive & integrated case management;
- · Monitor & re-assess cases on a longitudinal basis
- · Compliance with law & standards of practice
- Continuous improvement & adaptability
- Case Scenarios & Applications



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### **Enhancing Your Experience!**

### Maximize opportunities to enhance your practice

- Actively engage with the training
- · Contribute to and learn from others
- Build collaborative networks
- · Introduce yourself and share contact information
- Commit to a process of continual development
- · Identify next steps for enhancing & applying your skills



application of concepts.





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**OVERVIEW OF BEHAVIORAL** THREAT ASSESSMENT & MANAGEMENT

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### **Discussion Point:**

### What is **Threat Assessment** & Management?

For further consideration

- Do various people or groups view threat assessment differently? Who does <u>not</u> understand the role and function of the threat assessment team as well as you would like?
  - How do you address misperceptions/concerns?

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








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Threat Assessment & Management Process

BTAM facilitates a more objective process:

There are no facts, only interpretations.

— Friedrich Nietzsche

Behavior,
Information
Observations

Assessment
& Conclusions

Deisinger, 2017

Deisinger, 2017

Deisinger, 2017

What is Concerning or Aberrant Behavior?

Concerning Behavior:

Behaviors or communications that cause concern for:

The health, safety, or well-being of the subject

Their impact on the health, safety, or well-being of others, or

Both

Aberrant Behavior:

Behaviors or communications that are unusual or atypical for the person or situation, and that cause concern for the health, safety or well-being of the subject, others, or both.

What is Threatening Behavior?

· Indicates a subject may pose a danger to the safety or well-

in writing

electronically

or through any other means

> other behavior that would cause harm to self or others

· Observed by or communicated directly to the target or

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Is considered a threat regardless of whether:

· Observed by or communicated to a third party or

Whether the target is aware of the threat

Threatening Behaviors include any:

being of the community:

behaviorally

verbally

visually

> through acts of violence or

Communication(s) or behavior(s) that:

May be expressed or communicated:

### **Concerning / Aberrant Behavior**

- Concerning or Aberrant Behavior (examples):
  - Withdrawal, isolation or alienation from others
  - Sudden changes to usual attire, behavior, or hygiene
  - Changes in eating or sleeping habits
  - Sullen or depressed behavior
  - Declining work performance
  - Atypical interest or fascination with weapons or violence
  - Expression of unresolved grievances
  - · Fearful, anxious, depressed, tense, reactive or suspicious
  - · Feelings of helplessness or decreased self-esteem
  - Confrontational, accusatory, or blaming behavior
     Increased levels of agitation, frustration, or anger
  - Atypical outbursts of verbal or physical aggression
  - Atypical outbursts of verbal or physical aggression

Focus on violence as means of addressing a grievance
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
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### **Threatening Behaviors** Threatening behaviors (examples): Physical violence toward a person or property Directly communicated threats Leakage Overt physical or verbal intimidation Ongoing bullying or harassment Throwing objects or other gestures intended to cause fear Making statements about harming self/others Statements or behaviors indicating suicidality Research or planning related to carrying out violence Building capability for harm to self/others Stalking Unlawful possession of weapons on campus or at events Warning others of impending actions © Deisinger, G. (2023)

**Threat Assessment & Management Goal** The primary goal of the threat assessment and management process is to support and enhance the health, safety, and/or well-being of the organization/community. DCIS DEISINGER © Deisinger, G. (2023)

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**Targeted Violence Targeted Violence:** Incident(s) of violence Where (a) potential assailant(s) Chooses a particular target(s) Prior to a violent/destructive act. Adapted from: FBI (2017). Making Prevention of Violence a Reality: Identifying, Assessing & Managing the Threat of Targeted Attacks www.fbi.gov/file-repository/making-prevention-a-reality.pdf DCJS © Deisinger, G. (2023)





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


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### **Targeted Violence Examples of Targeted Violence:** Public Mass Violence Lone Actor Terrorism / Violent Extremism Grievance-Based Violence impacting: · Workplace, schools, & campuses · Houses of Worship / Faith communities Government agencies / Public figures Domestic / Intimate Partner Violence\* Predatory Sexual Assault Sexual Misconduct Stalking Human Trafficking Gang Violence\* Harassment / Bullying / Mobbing Bias and Hate Crimes/Incidents Suicidal Acts in Public Spaces\* 📵 DEISINGER



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### **Understanding Targeted Violence**

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- There is no demographic profile of a perpetrator of targeted violence.
- There is no profile for the type of organization or community that has been targeted.
- A broad range of persons may engage in violence:

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- · Clients/customers/patrons
- · Contractors and vendors
- · People in relationships with staff or clients, and
- · People with no connection to the organization/community

A Study of Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters 2000-2013 **Protecting America's Schools** Making Prevention a Reality
Mass Attacks in Public Spaces: 2016-2020

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### **Understanding Targeted Violence**

- Most perpetrators act alone
- In many cases, others (e.g., staff, peers, family members, etc.) were involved in some way:
- · Failing to report concerns
- · Failing take other steps to prevent violence
- · Encouraging violence

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- · Helping with plans or preparation for violence.
- Most perpetrators of mass casualties used firearms
  - · Typically acquired from home
- Over 1/3 of perpetrators used knives

A Study of Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters 2000-2013 **Averted School Violence** 

Protecting America's Schools Indicators of School Crime and Safety Mass Attacks in Public Spaces: 2016-2020 © Deisinger, G. (2023)

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### **Understanding Targeted Violence**

- Many perpetrators were preoccupied with violent interests, incidents or perpetrators
- Many perpetrators had a history of violence
- Many perpetrators of mass violence had a history of disciplinary actions
- Many had prior contact with law enforcement
- Many perpetrators were suicidal in addition to their violent thoughts or acts toward others
- Suicidal behaviors are a significant and growing concern across all genders and age groups.

A Study of Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters 2000-2013 **Protecting America's Schools** Making Prevention a Reality
Mass Attacks in Public Spaces: 2016-2020

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### **Understanding Targeted Violence**

- Perpetrators usually had multiple motives
- · Most common: unresolved grievance with a peer
- Many perpetrators had multiple stressors, including significant difficulties with losses or failures
- Many <u>student</u> perpetrators had been victims of (or participated in) prior bullying, often known to others
- Most perpetrators did not threaten their targets directly prior to engaging in violence
- Many perpetrators expressed their grievances and aspects of their thoughts or plans to others
  - · Often through social media or online activities

A Study of Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters 2000-2013 Averted School Violence Protecting America's Schools

Mass Attacks in Public Spaces: 2016-© Deisinger, G. (2023) 2016-2020 DCIS






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### **Understanding Targeted Violence** • All perpetrators exhibited concerning behavior. Most perpetrators had engaged in multiple behaviors that caused others to have serious concerns about their behavior and/or well-being. Many perpetrators had experienced psychological, behavioral, or developmental symptoms, but may not have been diagnosed with a mental health condition or benefited from adequate treatment. Incidents of targeted violence are rarely sudden or impulsive acts. A Study of Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters 2000-2013 Averted School Violence Protecting America's Schools Making Prevention a Reality Mass Attacks in Public Spaces: 2016-2020 DEISINGER © Deisinger, G. (2023)



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### **Understanding Targeted Violence**

- Prior to most incidents of targeted violence, other people knew about aspects of the individual's ideas, plans or preparations to cause harm.
- Many bystanders who had knowledge of concerning behaviors did not report them.
- Often, there were concerns about the perpetrator by others outside of the organization, but the concerns were not reported to staff.

A Study of Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters 2000-2013 Averted School Violence
Protecting America's Schools Making Prevention a Reality Mass Attacks in Public Spaces: 2016-2020

Considerations: Who may be sources? How can we engage them? DEISINGER

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
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
### **Violence Prevention**

- Many acts of violence <u>can be prevented</u>.
- Information about a subject's ideas, behaviors, plans & preparations for violence can often be observed before harm can occur.
- Information about a subject's behavior, plans or preparations is likely to be scattered & fragmented.
- Keys for the community are to:
  - · Recognize concerns,
  - · Act quickly upon report of concerns,
  - · Gather relevant information,
  - · Enhance understanding of situation,
- · Facilitate intervention.

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### **Essential Elements of an Effective Threat Assessment & Management Process**

### Organizations must have a systematic process that:

- Utilizes a robust & relevant multi-disciplinary approach to address all threats;
- Enables coordinated & timely awareness of developing concerns through active community engagement;
- Facilitates a thorough & contextual assessment;
- Implements proactive & integrated case management;
- Monitors & re-assesses case on a longitudinal basis;
- Practices in accordance with relevant laws, regulations, policies, and recognized standards;
- Continuously improves & adapts to challenges & needs. © Deisinger (1998); Deisinger & Nolan (2021)

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### Multi-Disciplinary TAM Process:

### Goals:

- Increase awareness of developing concerns/threats
- Maximize skills and resources to address concerns
- Enhance ability to monitor outcomes
- Enhance community healthy, safety & well-being
- Enhance:
  - Communication
  - Collaboration
  - Coordination
  - Capitalization

By far the most valuable prevention strategy identified was the threat assessment and management team

EBI (2017) Making Prevention a Reality FBI (2017) Making Preve

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### **Establishing a BTAM Team:**

**BTAM** is a Systematic Process That:

**Utilizes a robust & relevant** 

multi-disciplinary approach

to address all threats

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### Developing the Team:

- Mission: Purpose, scope, functions & authority
- Executive support
- Community support
- Principles:
- · View violence as a community & public health concern not solely a law enforcement or clinical issue
- "Do no harm"
- Enhance health, safety & well-being of the community
- · Build a lawful, collaborative & comprehensive approach for identification, assessment & management of concerns
- · Emphasize prevention and early intervention
- · Sustain engagement & reintegration following release from intensive care environments

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
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### **Considerations For Community BTAM**



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### Challenges: Subjects: Paths cross roles and jurisdictions Targets: Paths cross roles and jurisdictions Organizations: · Don't understand each other's roles and resources · Don't communicate, collaborate or coordinate Under-resourced · Don't recognize or understand threat · Don't share investment · Fail to consider context & systems © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. (1996) DCJS © Deisinger, G. (2023)









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### **Establishing a BTAM Team**

### **Considerations for Members/Partners:**

- Education: School Division(s), Institutions of Higher Ed
- Law Enforcement
  - · Local: Municipal, University, County Police, County Sheriff
  - Virginia State Police / Virginia Fusion Center / NVRIC
  - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  - · Department of Homeland Security
- Community Service Board / Mental Health Agencies
- Community Corrections / Juvenile Justice
- Commonwealth Attorney
- EMS / Fire Service
- Animal Control
- Healthcare Systems

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### Membership

### **Considerations for Members/Partners:**

- Social / Human Services
- Domestic Violence Advocacy / Shelters
- · Family & Child Services/Protection
- Homeless services
- Veterans Affairs
- Houses of Worship / Faith Communities
- Key corporate/business stakeholders
- Threat Management Professional \*
- Independent Medical/Psychological Evaluator \*\*



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### Scope: All Threats

### **Subject Relation to Workplace**

- Type 1: Unaffiliated (with other criminal intent)
- Type 2: Customer/Client
- Type 3: Employee
- Type 4: Personal Relationship

Source: Occupational Safety & Health Administration, US Dept of Labor

Type 5: Unaffiliated (without other criminal intent)

Source: G. Deisinger (2005)



What challenges do you see in addressing subjects who may have no, or limited, connection to the community?



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### **Establishing a Community BTAM**

### **Critical Factors:**

- Understand & articulate needs & challenges
- Establish authority for process
- Community stakeholder commitment & engagement
- Enhance BTAM capabilities within organizations
- Implement effective structure and protocols
- Engaging & coordinating multi-disciplinary resources
- Understand and apply relevant law and policy
- Respect boundaries, confidentiality and civil liberties/rights

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- Training
- Community awareness

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**Establishing a Community BTAM** 

### Considerations:

- Consider Role(s) of Community BTAM:
- · Manage or advise cases?
- · Investigate cases?
- · Review cases?
- Generate reports?
- · How maintain confidentiality & protect civil liberties?
- · Provide guidance on BTAM processes?
- · Provide outreach to community?
- · Role of law enforcement?
  - Law enforcement based
- Law enforcement facilitated
- Law enforcement supported
- Community collaboration

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### TAM is a Systematic Process That:

**Enables coordinated & timely awareness** of developing concerns through active community engagement

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








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Importance of Reporting

Key considerations:

Reporting allows concerns to be addressed

Earlier reporting allows greater range of options

The threat management process is designed to help

Goals are to maintain the health, safety and well-being of the campus community

"If you see, hear, or know something, say something and do something."

Adapted from: NYC Metropolitan Transportation Authority

What might create barriers to reporting: How can we overcome these?

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Who Can Report? • Require all members of the community to report: Concerning or threatening communications or behaviors indicating intent to harm self or others, or that a person may otherwise need intervention or assistance Reports of concern can come from: · Managers/Supervisors Staff · Contractors/vendors Intimate partners of members · Relatives of members Community members Considerations: How can we educate the community on recognizing concerns and how/when to report? · Other entities How do we build trust and engagement in the DCJS © Deisinger, G. (2023)


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




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
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




Facilitates a thorough & contextual assessment

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### **Imminent Situation**

If the situation is emergent or imminent, initiate crisis response procedures according to school policy, e.g.:

- Involve law enforcement and appropriate security personnel
- Initiate relevant security protocols
- Notify key administrators
- When safe to do so, move on to triage and assessment steps to further resolve any ongoing threat posed

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### Triage and Screening

### Timely and systematic review by trained personnel

- Consider Triage/Screening Team:
- Minimum of two (2) members
- Different roles/departmentsReview initial report(s)
- Consult relevant records/sources

### Triage / screening process shall:

- Consider the nature and level of concern indicated
- Determine if existing resources and mechanisms are sufficient to address those concerns
- Determine whether the full team needs to further assess and manage the situation
- Initiate any crisis responses as appropriate

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### Inquire / Gather Information

Review relevant records based on lawful and ethical access to information, such as:

- Prior threat assessment team contacts
- Work performance history
- Disciplinary or personnel actions
- Law enforcement or security contacts at organization and in the community
- Critical involvement with mental health or social services
- Presence of known problems, grievances, or losses
- Current or historical grievances that may be related to the behavior of concern
- Online searches: internet, social media, email, etc.

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# Social Media Landscape Conversation Prism 5.0 Brian Solis https://alcpartners.com/ https://saferschoolstogether.com/ Co Delsinger, G. (2023) Co Delsinger, G. (2023)

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### Inquire/Gather Information

### **Consider interviews:**

- Initial interviews to verify report:
  - · Person(s) reporting threat
  - Person(s) receiving report of threat
  - Target/Recipient(s) of threat
  - Witness(es)
- · Subject of concern
- Other potential sources:
  - Peers: Friends/Co-workers
  - · Employers, teaches, other staff
  - Parents/guardians
  - Relational Partners
  - Local law or state enforcement
  - Community services

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### Considerations:

 Corroboration of information across these sources may be critical in helping to assess the level and nature of the threat.

What may be revealed by significant differences in the information provided by these

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### **Considerations for Interviewing**

### Considerations for interviews:

- By whom?
- With what skill set?
- In what setting?
- With what goals in mind?
  - Information gathering and assessment;
  - Redirect from violence/targets;
  - Problem solving/support
  - Set boundaries/limitations
  - · Admonishment/confrontation
  - Intervention/support/referral
  - Monitoring
- MonitoringDeterrence

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 Are TAT members adequately trained and prepared to conduinterviews?

Considerations:

Who may be best suited to conduct this interview?

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








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### Key Areas for Inquiry - Subject

### What situation(s) or behaviors are causing concern?

- Does the situation or circumstance that led to these concerns still exist?
- When and where and do the behaviors tend to occur?
- Is there a pattern to the behaviors or a change in pattern of behavior that is causing concern?
- If the behaviors have occurred previously, how has the subject dealt with the grievances?
- Has subject previously come to someone's attention?
- Are the subject's behaviors causing others concern for the welfare of the subject, or others, or both?

Adapted from: FBI (2017) Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing & Managing Threats of Targeted Attacks; \*\* Meloy, et al. (2012). The Role of Warning Behaviors in Threat Assessment; U.S. Secret Service (2000 Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment in Vestigations: A Guide for State & Local Law Enforcement Official Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment investigations: A Guide for State & Local Law Enforcement Official Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment investigations: A Guide for State & Local Law Enforcement Official Protection and Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment investigations: A Guide for State & Local Law Enforcement Official Protection and Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide Foreign Control Protection and Protect **DCJS** © Deisinger, G. (2023)

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### **Key Areas for Inquiry - Subject**

Have there been any concerning, aberrant, threatening, or violent communications?

- Were there <u>Directly Communicated Threats\*</u>?
- Has there been <u>Leakage\*</u>?
- How and to whom is the subject communicating?
- · What is relationship between subject and target?
- · What means/modes communication have been used?
- What is the Intensity of Effort\*\* in communications or attempts to address grievance?
- Do the communications provide insight about motives, grievances, ideation, planning, preparation, targets, etc.?
- Has anyone been alerted or "warned away"?

Adapted from: "Meloy, et al. (2012). The Role of Warning Behaviors in Threat Assessment; "" FBI (2017) Makin, Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing & Managing Threats of Targeted Attacks; U.S. Secret Service (2000) Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State & Local Law Enforcement Officials DCJS

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### Key Areas for Inquiry – Subject

### What are the subject's motives and goals?

- Does the subject have a major grievance or grudge?
- Against whom? What is the relationship?
- Are there other motives that support use of violence such as desire for notoriety/fame?
- What do they seem to want to achieve?
- Is the subject exhibiting <u>Fixation\*</u>?
  - Increasing perseveration on person/cause or need for resolution
  - Increasingly strident and negative characterization of target
  - Angry emotional undertone, accompanied by
  - Social or occupational deterioration
- What efforts have been made to resolve the problem?

Adapted from: \* Meloy, et al. (2011). The Role of Worning Behaviors in Threat Assessment; FBI (2017) Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing & Managing Threats of Targeted Attacks; U.S. Secret Service (2000) rotective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State & Local Law Inforcement Officials DCJS

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### Key Areas for Inquiry - Subject

Has subject demonstrated significant or novel interest in violence or other perpetrators:

- Do they exhibit heightened interest, fascination, obsession, or fixation with acts of violence?
- Do they immerse themselves in violence?
- Is there *Identification*\* (strong desire or need to emulate/be like others) with:
  - · Perpetrators of targeted violence or powerful figures
  - · Grievances of other perpetrators
  - · Weapons or tactics of other perpetrators
- Effect or notoriety of other perpetrators
- Ideologies or groups that support and encourage violence

Adapted from: \* Meloy, et al. (2011). The Role of Warning Behaviors in Threat Assessment; FBI (2017) Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing & Managing Threats of Targeted Attacks; U.S. Secret Service (2000) Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State & Local Law Inforcement Officials

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### **Key Areas for Inquiry – Subject**

Does the subject have (or are they developing) the capacity to engage in targeted violence?

- Are there <u>Pathway Warning Behaviors</u>\*?
  - Planning
- Preparation (Means, Method, Opportunity, Proximity)
- Where on the Pathway?
- Are there changes in activity levels or <u>Energy Bursts</u>\*?
- How organized is the subject's thinking and behavior?
- History of violence or aspects of Novel Aggression\*?
- Is subject developing perceived capability?

Adapted from: \* Meloy, et al. (2011). The Role of Worning Behaviors in Threat Assessment; FBI (2017) Making Prevention a Reality; Identifying, Assessing & Managing Threats of Targeted Attacks; U.S. Secret Service (2000) rotective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State & Local Lum Enforcement Officials

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**Enhancing Collaborative Partnerships to Identify, Assess, and Manage Risk for Targeted Violence and Terrorism** 

### Key Areas for Inquiry - Subject

Is the subject experiencing hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair?

- Has subject experienced perceived loss, failure, injustice?
- Does subject express shame or humiliation?
- Is subject having significant difficulty coping?
- Are there indications of <u>Last Resort Behaviors</u>\*?
  - · Desperation, despair, finality or action imperative
  - · Violence justified to address perceived grievance Lack of perceived alternatives
  - · Lack of concern for, or welcoming consequences
  - · Development of legacy token \*\*

Adapted from: \* Melov, et al. (2011). The Role of Warning Behaviors in Threat Assessment; \*\* FBI (2017) Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing & Managing Threats of Targeted Attacks; U.S. Secrete-Service (2000) Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide For State & Local Law Inforcement Officials © Deisinger, G. (2023)

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### **Key Areas for Inquiry - Subject**

Has the subject's behavior indicated or raised concern of need for intervention or supportive services?

- Does subject have difficulty coping?
- Symptoms of severe, acute, untreated mental illness:
- · Significant lack of contact with reality:
  - > Hallucinations (especially command hallucinations)
  - Delusions (especially paranoid/persecutory or grandiosity)
  - Extreme wariness, distrust, paranoia
- · Symptoms that impact subject's perceptions of grievances or how others respond to subject
- Significant or sustained agitation or anxiousness
- · Significant or sustained depressed mood
- · Alcohol or other drug use/abuse
- · Pervasive patterns of maladaptive behavior
- Is subject actively engaged in treatment?

Adapted from: FBI (2017) Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing and Managing Threats of Targeted Attacks © Deisinger, G. (2023)



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### If triage identifies any of the following concerns, in addition to, or in place of, a potential threat to self,

Threats to Self: The Nexus Between Threat

**Assessment and Suicide Risk Assessment** 

- then the TAT should assume primary responsibility:
  - · Subject expresses ideation or intent to harm others
  - Subject expresses co-occurring anger or hostility to others
- · Subject's intent, preparations, or acts of harm to self would pose a threat of harm to others, whether intended or not
- Subject's suicidal or self-harm behaviors are responses to victimization, bias, bullying, harassment, or to other environmental/systemic issues within the campus
- · Others are, or may reasonably be, significantly impacted or feel endangered by the threat of harm to self

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### Key Areas for Inquiry - Subject

Does the subject have protective factors, stabilizers, or buffers that inhibit use of violence?


- Views violence as unacceptable/immoral
- Accepts responsibility for actions
- Demonstrates remorse for inappropriate behavior
- Respects reasonable limits and expectations
- Uses socially sanctioned means to address grievances
- Values life, job, relationships, freedom
- Maintains and uses effective coping skills
- Treatment compliance/engagement Sustains trusted and valued relationships

ed from: FBI (2017). Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing and Managing Threats of Targetee s; National Threat Assessment Center (2018). Enhancing School Safety Using a Threat Assessment Model: rational guide for preventing trapeted school violence.

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### **Enhancing Collaborative Partnerships to Identify, Assess, and Manage Risk for Targeted Violence and Terrorism**

### **Key Areas for Inquiry – Target**

### What are the vulnerabilities and needs of targets or others impacted by the situation?

- Are targets/others concerned for the well-being or safety of the subject, target or others?
- Are targets/others around the subject engaging in protective actions?
- Are targets/others experiencing stress, trauma, or other symptoms that may benefit from intervention/support?
- Do targets/others have adequate support resources?
- Are targets engaging in behaviors that increase their:
  - Desirability
- Availability
- Vulnerability

Adapted from: Deisinger (1996); Deisinger and Nolan (2021); FBI (2017). Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing and Managing Threats of Targeted Attacks.

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### **Intimate Partner Violence: Lethality Risk**

### **Key Perpetrator Lethality Risk Factors:**

- Direct access to firearm(s) [ 11.13]
- Threatened victim with a weapon [7.36]
- Nonfatal strangulation [7.23]
- Rape/Forced sex [5.44]
- Controlling behaviors [5.60]
- Threatened to harm victim [4.83]
- Abused victim while pregnant [3.93]
- Stalking [3.13]
- Jealousy [2.58]
- Substance Abuse [1.85]

Spencer, C.S., Stith, S.M. (2020). Risk factors for male perpetration and female victimization of intimate partner homicide: A meta-analysis. Trauma, Violence & Abuse, 21(3), 527-540.



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### **Intimate Partner Violence: Lethality Risk**

### **Key Victim Lethality Risk Factors:**

- Substance abuse [OR = 2.56]
- Less than high school education [OR = 2.45]
- Separated from perpetrator [OR = 2.33]
- Children from previous relationship [OR = 2.29]

Spencer, C.S., Stith, S.M. (2020). Risk factors for male perpetration and female victimization of intimate partner homicide: A meta-analysis. *Trauma, Violence & Abuse*, 21(3), 527-540.



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### **Key Areas for Inquiry - Environment**

### Are there Environmental/Systemic factors that are impacting the situation?

- Systemic, policy, or procedural problems
- Silos, gaps, or delays in reporting of concerns
- Poor conflict management skills
- Poor supervisory skills and/or willingness to address
- Organizational climate concerns: e.g., harassment, bullying
- Lack of support resources in community
- Social influences of others in environment; e.g.
- Actively discourage or encourage/dare use of violence
- Deny/minimize the possibility of violence
- · Passively collude with act
- Stochastic Terrorism\*: Incite violence through public demonization of a person or group

Deisinger (1996); Deisinger & Nolan (2021); FBI (2017). Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing & Managing Threats of Targeted Attacks. \* Ammon & Meloy (2021);

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### **Risk Factors for Workplace Violence**

### **Environment / Workplace Factors**

- Understaffing leading to job overload or compulsory overtime
- Frustrations from poorly defined job tasks and responsibilities
- Downsizing or reorganization
- Labor disputes and poor labor-management relations
- Poor management styles (e.g., arbitrary or unexplained orders)
- Corrections or reprimands in front of other employees
- Inconsistent discipline
- Inadequate security
- A lack of employee counseling
- A high injury rate
- Frequent grievances

Federal Bureau of Investigation (2004). Workplace Violence: Issues in Response

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### **Key Areas for Inquiry – Precipitating Events**

### Are there precipitating events that may impact the situation currently and in foreseeable future?

- Loss, failure, or injustice
- Key dates/events
- Triggers and reminders of any of the above
- Opportunity
- Contagion effect
- Case management interventions

Source: Deisinger (1996); Deisinger and Nolan (2021)

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### **Precipitating Events Intervention Outcomes** Improve situation. Worsen situation. No discernable change in situation. Create new concern/situation. Source: Deisinger (1996)

### Key Areas for Inquiry - Global

### What is the consistency and credibility and completeness of information about the situation?

- Are the subject's conversation and "story" consistent?
- Do collateral sources confirm or dispute each other?
- Do sources have direct and unique knowledge?
- Are there multiple sources?
- Do any sources have ulterior motives?
- What gaps exist in understanding of situation?
- What biases or misperceptions may be present? Source: Deisinger (1996); Deisinger and Nolan (2021)

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### **Decision-Making**

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### Managing Information to decrease Cognitive Overload:

- Humans do not multi-task well, despite perceptions
- Instead, we shift attention from task to task
- Decrease level of attention to given task
- · Decrease quality of attention
- Optimal information load is 4 6 items
  - · Maximum information load is 10 items
  - · Irrelevant information still contributes to overload
- Consider how you brief on cases
  - Prepare summary before team discussion
  - · Organize case information systematically

Daniel Levitin (2014) The Organized Mind



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### **Support Structured Professional Judgment**

### Systematize data collection and assessment:

- Workplace Assessment of Violence Risk (WAVR-21)
- Historical Clinical Risk Management-20, 3rd ed. (HCR 20)
- Cawood Assessment Grid
- MOSAIC (DeBecker)
- Communicated Threat Assessment Protocol (CTAP)
- Stalking Risk Profile

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- Guidelines for Stalking Assessment & Management (SAM)
- Screening Assessment for Stalking & Harassment (SASH)
- Dangerousness Assessment (Campbell)
- Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (ODARA)
- Spousal Risk Assessment Guide (SARA)
- Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP 18)
- Violence Risk Assessment Guide (VRAG)
- Classification of Violence Risk (COVR)

Note: This is a partial listing of supplemental instruments and not an endorsement of any particular approach. © Deisinger, G. (2023)



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### **Using Assessment Tools**

### Appropriate use of instruments:

- Ensure that instrument is reliable and valid;
- Be aware of limitations of the instrument;
- Use for purpose for which it was designed.
- Stay current with new data and versions;
- Ensure evaluator is properly trained;
- Avoid reliance on instrument only;
- Integrate information with structured professional judgment.

Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (2006). Risk Assessment Guideline Elements for Violer

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### **Decision-Making**

### **Facilitating Effective Case Discussions:**

- Active participation by all team members
- Keep discussion focused on the case
- Minimize bias in decision-making
  - · Consider totality and context of information available
  - · Consider information sources, credibility and relevance
  - Corroborate critical information: resolve discrepancies
- · Avoid generalizations or stereotypes, focus on behavior
- · Consider changes in behavior or circumstances
- · Be inquisitive and challenge assumptions · Consider the impact of the unknowns
- Focus on active problem-solving

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



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


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### **Priority Classification**

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Priority 1 (Critical) – Subject poses immediate/imminent threat of serious violence or harm to self/others. Target/others are vulnerable and/or have support needs. Environmental/systemic factors & Precipitating events typically present. Requires immediate law enforcement and administration notification, subject mitigation & containment, activation of crisis response and notification protocols, target protection & safety planning, ongoing assessment and management planning, active monitoring, and target/community support.

Priority 2 (High) – Subject poses, or is rapidly developing capability to pose a threat of serious violence or harm to self /others; or is in urgent need of intervention/assistance. Target/others are vulnerable and/or have support needs. Environmental/systemic factors & precipitating events typically present, Requires immediate law enforcement & administration notification. subject mitigation, activation of crisis response protocols as appropriate, target protection and safety plan, ongoing assessment and management plan, active monitoring, and target/community support. © Deisinger, G. (2023)

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Priority 3 (Moderate) - Subject not known to pose a threat of serious violence or harm though risk cannot be ruled-out. Subject may be developing capability for harm and/or engaging in aberrant or concerning behaviors that indicate need for assistance/intervention. Targets/others likely concerned and impacted. Environmental/systemic & precipitating factors may be present. Consider law enforcement, security & administrative notification as appropriate. Requires ongoing assessment and management plan, and active monitoring. Referrals as appropriate.

**Priority Classification** 

Priority 4 (Low) - Subject does not indicate a threat of violence or harm to self/others; but would/may benefit from intervention/assistance. Target or environmental/systemic concerns, or precipitating events may be present at low levels. May involve ongoing assessment/management with passive monitoring or periodic active monitoring. Referrals as appropriate; Close case if no TAM interventions or monitoring indicated.

Priority 5 (No Identified Concerns) - Subject does not pose threat of violence or harm to self or others; or need for assistance or intervention. No target needs, environmental factors, or precipitants that need TAM intervention. DCJS

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TAM is a systematic process that:

Implements proactive & integrated case management plans

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


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### Implement appropriate strategies:

- No further action
- Monitor/Watch & wait
- Third party monitoring
- Third party intervention
- Direct intervention: Support, assist, referral, confrontation
- Administrative actions
- No contact/communication notice, probation, suspension, expulsion/termination, no trespass/ban from premises
- Civil actions
- Mental Health interventions (voluntary or involuntary)
- Criminal justice interventions

Adapted from: Calhoun & Weston (2003) Contemporary Threat Management



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### **Subject-Based Strategies**

### Implement appropriate strategies:

- Check-in / Checkout
- · Maintain channel of communication & engagement
- · Gather information
- · Build rapport and relationship
- · Decrease isolation
- De-escalate volatile reactions
- Set expectations
- Provide feedback & mentoring
- Monitor reactions to grievances and precipitating events
- Problem solving about legitimate grievances
- Spouse / Parental / Family involvement
  - Parent training / support



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### **Subject-Based Strategies**

### Implement appropriate strategies:

- Assistance or support services;
- Trauma informed approaches
- · Work mentoring / Academic tutoring
- Alternative work / school placement
- Accommodations for work/school
- Social / emotional learning
- Behavioral management plans
- · Positive behavioral intervention & support (PBIS) programs

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- · Involvement in extra-curricular activities
- · Modification of work schedule or assignments
- Performance improvement plans
- Peer coaching/mentoring
- Recognition / positive engagement

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### **Subject-Based Strategies**

### Implement appropriate strategies:

- Counseling/mental health services
  - Check-in/check-out with mental health staff
- Disability / mental health / violence risk assessment
  Suicide prevention & intervention programs
- Outpatient counseling / mental health care
- · Emergency psychiatric evaluation & care



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### **Subject-Based Strategies**

### Implement appropriate strategies:

- Disciplinary measures
  - Subject confrontation or warning / boundaries
  - Disciplinary sanctions/corrective measure
  - · Parental involvement (students)
  - Administrative orders for no contact of communication

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- Suspension
- · Termination / expulsion
- Criminal Justice Services
  - · Law enforcement / juvenile justice involvement
  - · Court issued protective orders
  - · Emergency risk protection ("Red flag") orders
  - Diversion programs
- · Mandated mental health services

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**Enhancing Collaborative Partnerships to Identify, Assess, and Manage Risk for Targeted Violence and Terrorism** 

### **Subject Control Strategies**

Leave, suspension, or termination options that focus solely on controlling the person do not address the longterm challenges of:

- Moving person away from thoughts & plans of, and capacity for, violence and/or disruption;
- Connecting person to resources (where needed);
- Mitigating organizational/systemic factors;
- Monitoring person when they are no longer connected to organization.

Use with intentionality, awareness of limitations, and anticipation of consequences.

Source: Deisinger (1996); Deisinger & Nolan (2021)

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### **Re-Entry Planning and Preparation**

### Prepare for re-integration of subject:

- Establish conditions for return
- Evaluate subject readiness to safely and effectively return to participate in school or work experience
- Develop proactive case management plan
  - · Align ongoing interventions
  - · Coach subject about re-entry
- Anticipate environmental aspects which may impact subject
- Prepare community for subject's re-entry
- · Consider precipitating events
- Monitor, re-assess and intervene as appropriate

Source: Deisinger (2011); Deisinger and Nolan (2021) DCIS

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**Target Management Strategies** 

Organizational roles in reducing target vulnerability



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### **Target Management Strategies**

### Coaching regarding personal safety approaches

- Set clear limits and boundaries
- Monitor communications for changes/escalations
- Avoid contact/response
- Document all contacts from/with subject
- Minimize reactivity to subject actions
- Minimize public information
- Maintain/enhance situational awareness
- Vary routine
- Develop contingency plans: Escape, shelter, defense
- Utilize support systems

Source: Deisinger (1996): Deisinger and Nolan (2021)

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Safety escorts

Fear management

Security staffing

EAP/Counseling referrals

Engagement with target Support for target

Change work location

Change work/school hours

Enhance physical security

Notice to co-workers/classmates

Source: Deisinger (1996); Deisinger and Nolan (2021)

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### **Environmental Management Strategies**

- Address systemic, policy, or procedural problems
- Identify/address reporting gaps/delays
- Intervene with associates that support violent behavior
- Enhance conflict management skills
- Enhance supervisory skills & accountability
- Enhance organizational climate caring community
  - · Emphasize fairness & respect
  - · Effective communication
  - · People rewarded, supported, and held accountable
  - Prevention & early intervention with inappropriate behaviors
  - · Build engagement for mutual safety & well-being

Source: Deisinger (1996); FBI (2004); Deisinger & Nolan (2021)

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### **Manage Precipitating Events**

- Minimize unnecessary precipitants where possible
- Consider impact of interventions
- Monitor reactions to case management/interventions
- Monitor & plan for loss / Injustice
- Monitor & plan for key dates / events
- Monitor for reactions to administrative/court actions
- Consider contingency plans

Source: Deisinger (1996): Deisinger & Nolan (2021)

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



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Current Practice: Schools & IHE's Required by legislation: Virginia: Public Institutions of Higher Education (2008) K-12 School Divisions (2013) Illinois All Institutions of Higher Education (2008) All K-12 School Districts (2019) Connecticut: All Institutions of Higher Education (2013) Florida: K-12 Schools (2018) Maryland: K-12 Schools (2018) Kentucky: K-12 Schools (2019) Oregon: K-12 Schools (2019) Pennsylvania: K-12 Schools (2019) Rhode Island: K-12 Schools (2019) Texas: K-12 Schools (2019) Washington: K-12 Schools (2019) Ohio: K-12 Schools (2021) New Jersey: K-12 Schools (2022) Tennessee: K-12 Schools (2023)
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### What Laws, Regulations, Rules May Apply?

- Constitutional issues,
- Civil Rights
- Federal & State Healthcare Privacy Laws
- Federal & State Disability Laws
- Federal & State Employment Laws
- Federal & State Employee Privacy Laws
- Federal/State Intelligence/Fusion Center Privacy Policies
- State Threat Assessment Laws, Regulations, Standards
- Record-Keeping & Open Records Laws
- Standards of Practice / Tort Law
- Organizational Policies

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### Civil Rights and Liberties

- The U.S. Constitution prohibits the government from:
  - Making laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion
  - Abridging free speech, the press, or the right of the people to assemble
- The Constitution protects the rights of individuals to:
  - Speak freely

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- Peacefully protest
- BTAM programs, and government agencies that are part of such programs, may not profile, target, or discriminate against any individual for exercising their constitutional rights regarding expression of beliefs.

Adapted from US Department of Homeland Security: Community Awareness Briefing

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**Enhancing Collaborative Partnerships to Identify, Assess, and Manage Risk for Targeted Violence and Terrorism** 

### **EXERCISE: Information Sharing & FERPA**

An instructor approaches you (a BTAM member) very concerned about an interaction they just had with a student after a class. During that conversation the student engaged in behaviors and made statements that lead the instructors to believe that the student was a serious threat to the safety of themselves and others on campus.

Based on the information shared, you concur there appears to be a significant threat.

When you ask the name of the student and about their behavior and performance in the class, the instructor becomes very cautious and says they are not sure if they can provide that information, that they don't want to violate privacy law and be sued by the student.

What mistakes, if any, are being made?

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### Information Sharing: FERPA

- Is not an impediment to effective threat assessment and management.
- Protects educational records, not observations, verbal communications, direct personal knowledge, etc.
- Allows sharing with:
  - > School officials with legitimate educational interest
  - > Other educational settings for enrollment or transfer
  - Outside of campus to protect health or safety
- Does not govern law enforcement unit records.
- If created and maintained by law enforcement, for law enforcement purposes.
- Does not permit a private right of action.

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### Introduction

### **Key Resources:**

- **Information Sharing Guide for K12 Public Schools**
- Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (2020)
- **Information Sharing Guide for Institutions of Higher Education**
- Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (2021)
- **Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act Regulations**
- 34 C.F.R. Part 99 (amended 2022)
- **Addressing Emergencies on Campus**
- · U.S. Department of Education (June 2011)
- School Resource Officers, School Law Enforcement Units, and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)
  - U.S. Department of Education (2019)
- A Quick Guide to Information Sharing During Threat Reporting & Assessment
  - National Center for School Safety

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### Disclosures Allowed Under HIPAA

Disclosure of "protected health information" is allowed if provider makes good faith determination that disclosure:

- "Is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health and safety of a person or the public" and disclosure
- "Is made to a person or persons reasonably able to prevent or lessen the threat, including the target of the threat"

Sharing Behavioral Health Information: Tips & Strategies for Police-Mental Health Collaborations Information Sharing in Criminal Justice-Mental Health © Deisinger, G. (2023)

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### **Understanding Confidentiality**

Confidentiality is right held by client, not the mental health provider.

- In cases where privacy laws apply, consider these
  - Ask subject for authorization to disclose.
  - · No legal prohibition against providing information to health professionals.
  - · Ask medical provider about Tarasoff type duty to warn/protect.
  - · Request and document name of provider.

Sharing Behavioral Health Information: Tips & Strategies for Police-Mental Health Collaborations Information Sharing in Criminal Justice-Mental Health

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### **Policies to Support the Process**

### Policies with TAM-related implications:

- Workplace violence prevention
- Threat assessment & management
- Harassment & discrimination
- Crisis management
- Employee discipline
- Interim suspension
- Fitness for duty
- Direct threat evaluations
- Weapons
- Bomb threat
- **Pandemic**

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








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
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



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











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
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
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


**Enhancing Collaborative Partnerships to Identify, Assess, and Manage Risk for Targeted Violence and Terrorism** 






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


Informed by Research & Practice Mass Attacks in Public Spaces: 2016-2020 (2023) US Dept. of Homeland Security **US Secret Service** National Threat Assessment Center Available at: https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2023-01/usssntac-maps-2016-2020.pdf DCJS © Deisinger, G. (2023)

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Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services




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**Enhancing Collaborative Partnerships to Identify, Assess, and Manage Risk for Targeted Violence and Terrorism** 





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### **Overcoming the Silo Effect** Communication and Coordination are Critical! • Multiple processes/teams that may manage cases: • Employee Assistance / CARE Team · Threat Assessment · Bias / Sexual Harassment • Domestic Violence / Dating Violence / Stalking Insider Threat Management Programs Dignitary Protection • Mind the Gap! · Clarify mission/roles Shared membership · Regular communication Integrated planning Designated authority and responsibility Source: Deisinger (2015); Deisinger & Nolan (2021)

Contagion Effect

Time Between Mass Shootings, 1982-2014


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


**Violent Extremism: Global Threat Growth of Global Interconnectedness**  Crowdsourcing funds online Sharing tactics, techniques & procedures for action Inspiration through sharing manifestos and livestreams Recruitment for direct action / combat Recruitment through youth scenes Online Social media > Encrypted communication Gaming · Music festivals Miller-Idress, C. (2020). Hate in the Homeland · Combat sports Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. DCJS 🕅 DEISINGER © Deisinger, G. (2023)

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**Enhancing Collaborative Partnerships to Identify, Assess, and Manage Risk for Targeted Violence and Terrorism** 



Reducing Extremism:

Address disinformation

Reduce polarization of response

Redirect to groups/goals that enhance significance

Identify and address grievances (where possible)

Accountability for violence/criminal behavior

Re-Imagining Policing
Guardian; Community-engaged, trust-building
Avoid over-reach

### Establishing a BTAM Process

### Considerations:

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- Team Training:
  - · Member roles, responsibilities & resources
  - Confidentiality, privacy, & information sharing guidelines
  - · Behavioral threat assessment & management process
  - Reporting options & methods
- Community training:
- Community awareness
- · Crisis evaluators
- Mental health & social service providers
- Law enforcement officers
- Corrections / Jail staff
- EMS / Fire Service



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### Course(s) of Action

### **Prepare Foundations:**

- Review/integrate existing mechanisms & resources
- Implement/enhance process structure
- Train key stake-holders in process
- Build collaborative relationships
- Implement systematized process:
  - Reporting
  - · Screening/Triage
  - · Operational Guidelines (manual)
  - BTAM Casework
  - Ongoing Process Review / Continuous Improvement

SEE RESOURCE: Self & Team Assessment Worksheet

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### **Contact Information**

Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety www.dcjs.virginia.gov/virginia-center-school-and-campus-safety

### **Donna Michaelis**

Division Director
Division of Public Safety Training and
Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety
Donna.Michaelis@dcjs.virginia.gov

### **Marc Dawkins**

Law Enforcement and Public Safety Training Manager
Division of Public Safety Training and
Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety
Marc.Dawkins@dcjs.virginia.gov

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## Contact Information: GENE DEISINGER, PH.D. President DEISINGER CONSULTING, LLC 1 +1 540-392-5284 Gene GDeisinger@DeisingerConsulting.com DeisingerConsulting.com Gene Deisinger Gene Deisinger DCIS Delsinger Delsinger DCIS Delsinger DEISINGER





